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1CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION
The 'April Theses' submitted by Lenin to the 
Central Committee of the Bolshevik Party early in 1917 
included a call for the foundation of a new international 
socialist movement to guide and coordinate world 
communism.'*' In Lenin's opinion there were two main 
imperatives for such an organisation: the need to provide
an alternative to the reformist (as opposed to 
revolutionary) Second International; and the perceived 
imminence of socialist revolution throughout Europe. The 
First Congress of the Communist International subsequently 
convened in Moscow in March 1919, by which time the 
Bolsheviks had seized state power in Russia and 
revolutionary prospects elsewhere still appeared 
favourable. Under Lenin's forceful patronage, the 
Comintern seemed set to play a leading role in the attempt 
to realise those prospects.
Initially the attention of Comintern delegates 
was primarily focused on events in Europe, where the 
theoretically 'classic' Marxist confrontation between 
labour and capital was considered likely. Circumstances
1. V.I. Lenin, 'The Tasks of the Proletariat in the
Present Revolution' (the 'April Theses'), Selected 
Works, (3 Vols.), Vol. 2, Moscow, Progress
Publishers, 1975, pp 31-32. (Published 7 April 
1917. )
2in Asia were much less clear-cut, given that the economic 
stage of development there was generally considered to be 
'colonial and semi-feudal' - a situation which was, of 
course, inconsistent with rigidly orthodox interpretations 
of the necessary conditions for proletarian revolution. 
However, as revolutionary prospects in Europe began to 
recede rapidly, the Comintern started to pay more 
attention to the East. It therefore became necessary to 
develop a programme of action for Asia.
Almost from the outset Comintern officials were
confronted by the often conflicting demands of theory and
practice. In one of his most famous observations, Karl
Marx had once written that 'The philosophers have only
interpreted the world, in various ways; the point,
2however, is to change it'. A crucial question arises
from this: in the drive to change the world, to what
extent can 'understanding' - i.e. theories and analyses of 
social development - be interpreted, in the light of 
prevailing circumstances, during its translation into 
action?
While many complex factors were involved in 
developing a programme for action in the East, two emerged 
as being of primary importance, viz., nationalism and the 
participation in revolutionary activities of classes other
2. K. Marx, 'Theses on Feuerbach', in K. Marx and F.
Engels, Collected Works (40 Vols.), Vol. 5, London, 
Lawrence and Wishart, 1975-1983, p 5. (Written 
April 1845.) Emphasis in original.
3than the proletariat. These interrelated factors came to 
represent a source of intense ideological dispute. On 
the one hand, in the opinion of many communist theorists 
they characterised a revolutionary programme that was at 
odds with Marx's analysis of social development, yet, on 
the other, they were issues which were actively promoted 
by (among others) Lenin when he, unlike the authors of 
The Communist Manifesto, found himself a practitioner as 
well as a theorist of communism. The notions of 
revolutionary practice which emerged from this ideological 
conflict were of the utmost importance both within the 
Comintern and to those colonial leaders who were working 
within a communist framework in their attempts to 
overthrow foreign rule.
This sub-thesis is concerned in the first 
instance with the Comintern's theory for revolution in 
Asia, particularly in relation to nationalism and class 
cooperation, and attempts to translate that theory into 
revolutionary programmes. The consequences of those 
programmes are also examined, primarily by reference to 
the revolutionary movements in Turkey, China and Indo­
china, which between them experienced most of the 
resulting vicissitudes. Finally, some attention is 
focused on the influence on Comintern activities of Soviet 
foreign policy.
4Notes on Terminology
The names 'Asia' and 'the East' when used in 
this essay include both the Near East and the Far East.
Pinyin romanization has been used for Chinese 
words except where reference is made to source material, 
in which instances the romanization used by the particular 
author has been retained.
5CHAPTER II 
IDEAS
PART ONE; THE THEORETICAL BACKGROUND
At the heart of any discussion of Comintern 
actions in the East is the theoretical basis of those 
actions : the question the organisation's leaders 
constantly had to face up to was that of whether or not 
their policies were consistent with the Marxian analysis 
of social development. As was noted above, in its early 
years the Comintern was dominated by Lenin, who in turn 
has sometimes been accused of being little more than an 
opportunist who cut his ideological cloth to fit existing 
objective circumstances. This accusation of theoretical 
opportunism was put, for example, by Rosa Luxemburg as 
early as 1904 when she attacked Lenin's pamphlet 'What is 
to be Done'. In Luxemburg's opinion, 'Lenin's concern 
[was] not so much to make the activity of the party more 
fruitful as to control the p a r t y ' Yet in that same 
pamphlet, Lenin had placed great emphasis on the 
importance of theory to any revolutionary plan of action:
R. Luxemburg, 'Dictatorial Implications of Lenin's 
Concept of the Party', in S.N. Silverman, (Ed.), 
Lenin, New Jersey, 1972, p 140. Emphasis in 
original.
1.
6Without revolutionary theory there can be no 
revolutionary movement. This idea cannot be 
insisted upon too strongly at a time when the 
fashionable preaching of opportunism goes hand 
in hand with an infatuation for the narrowest 
forms of practical activity ... At this point we 
wish to state that the role of vanguard fighter 
can he fulfilled only by a party that is guided 
hy the most advanced theory.. 2
In other words, there would be little purpose to any 
revolutionary action which was theoretically unsound. 
Regardless of whether one accepts Luxemburg's criticism or 
Lenin's ideological propriety, the dispute clearly 
illustrates the importance of the fundamental nexus 
between revolutionary theory and action. It is because 
of that nexus that this essay must start with a review of 
the attitudes of the major communist theorists regarding 
the key factors in the East.
Nationalism was a question which received 
relatively little attention from Marx, whose analysis of 
social forces was essentially international. In the 
Marxian lexicon, society consists of classes, which are 
universal social groups defined by their members' 
relationship to the means of production. Social 
interests are thus expressed, not through the medium of 
nation states, but rather through that of universal 
economic classes. Since the progression to communism via
V. Lenin, 'What is to be Done?', Selected Works, Vol. 
1, Moscow, 1975, pp 109-110. (Article published in 
March 1902.) Emphasis in original.
2 .
7socialism demands the replacement of the bourgeoisie as 
the ruling class by the proletariat, it can therefore be 
argued that both nationalism and any kind of revolutionary 
cooperation between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie 
are alien to the Marxian analysis.
Yet within the basic framework of his 
argumentation Marx was by no means inflexible. In this 
case, while his long-term view was that a successful 
socialist revolution had to be international and that 
'working men have no country', he and Engels also 
appreciated that a sense of national identity existed 
within the proletariat, observing in The Communist 
Manifesto that: 'Since the proletariat must first of all
acquire political supremacy, must rise to be the leading
3class of the nation, it is, so far, itself national ...' 
Following on from this, Marx and Engels also appreciated 
that this sense of national identity could play a 
particular and constructive role during any struggle 
within nations for political supremacy: given the right
circumstances and correct theoretical guidance, 
nationalism could serve as a progressive revolutionary 
force.
In the first instance, Marx and Engels 
considered that in some nations the drive towards
3. K. Marx and F. Engels, The Communist Manifesto, 
Harmondsworth, 1967, p 102. (1848.)
8nationalism could be an important force in mobilising a
somewhat inert bourgeoisie against autocracy. Further,
while they believed that in the long term the socialist
revolution had to be international, they also appreciated
that the necessary degree of proletarian political
organisation could be most effectively developed 'initially
by building up working-class parties within existing
nations. They thus supported nationalist movements
fighting for Home Rule in Ireland, the unification of both
Germany and Italy, and national self-determination in 
4Poland.
The success of any nationalist movement in the 
countries cited would primarily depend on a 
proletarian/bourgeois alliance. However, in other areas 
of semi-industrialised Europe the bourgeoisie seemed to 
lack the impetus to complete the overthrow of feudalism 
which was its historic mission, regardless of any 
assistance. This chronic revolutionary weakness was one 
of a number of factors which led Marx to speculate in the 
Preface to the 1882 Russian edition of the Manifesto that
4. See Marx and Engels, Collected Works, 1Feargus
O'Connor and the Irish People', Vol. 6, pp 448-449, 
(January 1848); 'On Poland', Vol. 6, pp 388-390, 
(November 1847); 'The Zeitungs-Halle on the Rhine 
Province', Vol. 7, pp 399-401, (August 1848); 'The 
Italian Liberation Struggle and the Course of its 
Present Failure', Vol. 7, pp 385-387, (August 1848); 
q.v. Karl Marx, Selected Writings, (Ed. D. McLellan), 
Oxford, 1977, 'On Ireland', pp 590-592, in which in a 
letter to Engels dated 30 November 1867, Marx wrote 
'What the Irish need is self-government and 
independence from England'.
9in Russia the bourgeois (capitalist) phase of economic 
evolution might be bypassed: a proletarian/peasant
alliance might proceed directly from feudalism to
5socialism under the dictatorship of the proletariat. 
Clearly, this analysis was of great relevance to the East.
Some Marxists considered that the notion of 
class cooperation explicit in this observation was 
peripheral to the main thrust of Marxian analysis. They 
argued that it was accorded undue moment by subsequent 
theorists who, they claimed, used it as nothing more than 
a specious excuse for revolutionary expediency through the 
promotion of 'unnatural' short-term alliances between 
inherently irreconcilable classes.
However, as has already been pointed out, Marx 
and Engels were not inflexible. While this question was
5. Marx and Engels, The Communist Manifesto, p.56.
This observation was accompanied by a significant 
qualification: 'If the Russian Revolution becomes
the signal for a proletarian revolution in the West, 
so that both complement each other, the present 
Russian common ownership of land may serve as the 
starting point for a communist development.' q.v. 
Marx, 'Letter to Vera Zasulich', Selected Writings, 
pp 576-580, in which the same observation was made 
(written in 1881).
6. See, e.g. Rosa Luxemburg, The National Question, (Ed.
H.B. Davis), New York, 1976, p 316: 'Today ... to
raise the slogan of independence as a means to 
struggle against national oppression would be ... the 
denial of the simplest fundamentals of socialism ... 
The only result of such a program would be the 
weakening of class consciousness, the sharpening of 
national antagonisms, splitting the forces of the 
proletariat and increasing the danger of new wars'.
10
not central to their work, it was nevertheless one with 
which they had come to grips. They concluded that the 
main requirement in any alliance would be that of 
maintaining revolutionary integrity by protecting 
proletarian independence and class interests. As early 
as 1848 when they analysed the revolutionary circumstances 
then obtaining in Germany and, as a consequence, 
subsequently advocated a class alliance as a means of 
revitalising the anti-autocratic forces, they made it 
plain that partnerships were acceptable for reasons of 
short-term gain, but should be entered in to only when it 
was in the proletarian interest to do so. Here, the 
crucial factor was leadership, which was to be provided by 
the communist party. Addressing the leading role 
demanded of the party, Marx and Engels stated that:
In Germany [the party] fight with the 
bourgeoisie whenever it acts in a revolutionary 
way, against the absolute monarchy, the feudal 
squirearchy, and the petty-bourgeoisie.
But they never cease, for a single instant, to 
instil into the working class the clearest 
possible recognition of the hostile antagonism 
between bourgeoisie and proletariat,... in order 
that, after the fall of the reactionary classes 
in Germany, the fight against the bourgeoisie 
itself may immediately begin. 7
Two years later, in the same context, they spelt out the 
tactics to be followed by the proletariat:
7. Marx and Engels, The Communist Manifesto, p 120.
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The relation of the revolutionary workers' party 
to the petty-bourgeois democrats is this: it
marches together with them against the faction 
which it aims at overthrowing, it opposes them 
in everything by which they seek to consolidate 
their position in their own interests. 8
Those tactics would be dictated by the communist party:
The Communists, therefore, are on the one hand, 
practically, the most advanced and resolute 
section of the working-class parties of every 
country, that section which pushes forward all 
others; on the other hand, theoretically, they 
have over the great mass of the proletariat the 
advantage of clearly understanding the line of 
march, the conditions, and the ultimate general 
results of the proletarian movement. 9
Some fifty years later, Lenin amplified this notion of an 
elite vanguard party to lead the socialist revolution in 
his famous tract 'What is to be Done?', considered by many 
to be the definitive exposition on organisational power 
politics.
If class cooperation and nationalism were 
factors which could be used constructively in Europe to 
promote both the capitalist and socialist phases of the 
classic Marxist revolutionary model, then, as has been 
noted, they also seemed relevant to the East. There 
were, however, some important theoretical differences.
In contrast to Europe, where the stage of economic
8. Marx and Engels, 'Address of the Central Authority to 
the League', Collected Works, Vol. 10, p 280. (March 
1850. )
9. Marx and Engels, The Communist Manifesto, p 95.
12
development generally fell somewhere between the 
categories of feudalism and capitalism, much of Asia 
remained at the stage of Asiatic (Oriental) despotism or, 
at best, semi-feudalism. Whereas feudalism and 
capitalism, according to Marx and Engels, contained within 
themselves the seeds of their own destruction, Asiatic 
despotism was a stagnant socio-economic system. Marx and 
Engels believed that the most likely way in which the 
seemingly stationary institutional order of an Oriental 
despotism could be changed was through the influence of 
outside forces. As an example they cited the profound 
social impact of British colonisation on the Asiatic order 
in India where, in Marx's opinion, 'English interference 
... produced the greatest, and to speak the truth, the 
only social revolution ever heard of in Asia'.^ This 
outside interference not only shook the previously 
immobile social order but, by arousing hostile anti­
imperialist and anti-colonialist sentiments - which were 
expressed primarily through nationalism - set in train the 
inevitable forces of history and, therefore, the 
inevitable triumph of socialism. Even though the 
theoretical rationale might be different in some respects, 
the consequences of galvanising latent nationalist forces
Marx in the New York Daily Tribune, 25 June 1853, 
'The British Rule in India', Collected Works, Vol. 
12, p 131-132. Emphasis in original.
10.
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in Asia could be just as positive as those envisaged for 
Europe.
A perhaps less well-known, but nevertheless 
noteworthy aspect of nationalism also identified by Marx 
and Engels was that relating to the activities of a 
'civilising power'. The concept here was that, through 
the expression of nationalist ambitions from outside Asia, 
indigenous social turmoil would be incited. In an 
article in the New York Daily Tribune in 1855 they noted 
with approval the writings of a Count Gurowski, who had 
argued that:
... the legitimate outlet for the expansive 
force of Slavonic energies was Asia. As 
compared with the stagnant desolation of that 
old continent, Russia is a civilising power, and 
her contact could not be other than beneficial. 11
Apparently Slavic nationalism, manifested through 
'civilising power' expansionism into the East, could 
engender the same constructive revolutionary consequences
- viz., the overthrow of Oriental despotism and, thereby, 
the release of the necessary economic and class conflicts
- as had the essentially commercial British interference 
in India.
As a final observation on Marx's and Engels' 
position regarding nationalism and class alliances, their
11. Marx and Engels, 'Austria's Weakness' in the New York 
Daily Tribune, 7 May 1855, Collected Works, Vol. 14, 
pp 689-693.
14
definition of the revolutionary class in relation to anti­
colonial movements is of interest. There was never any 
equivocation regarding the proletariat's position as the 
sole 'special and essential' product of social evolution. 
However, when anti-colonial, anti-imperialist issues were 
discussed, reference was sometimes made to 'oppressed' 
peoples and nations, in a context which seemed to embrace 
most of those social groups opposed to an autocratic 
ruling order.
Marx and Engels remained somewhat vague in their 
use of the term, and it was left to Stalin, working under 
Lenin's direction, to give it theoretical clarity. 
Immediately prior to World War I, Stalin argued that 
international proletarian unity could only be realised if 
the workers of dominant nations were prepared to support 
the principle of self-determination for oppressed states. 
The kernel of Stalin's dissertation was an explicit 
connection between capitalism and imperialism:
When we put forward the principle of the right 
of peoples to self-determination we are thereby 
raising the struggle against national oppression 
to the level of a struggle against imperialism, 
our common foe. 12
Either we consider that we must create a rear 
for the vanguard of the socialist revolution in 
the shape of the peoples which are rising up
12. J. Stalin, 'Report on the National Question', in
Marxism and the National and Colonial Question, (2nd 
Ed.), London, 1936, p 64.
15
against national oppression - and in that case 
we shall build a bridge between the West and the 
East and shall indeed be steering a course 
towards the world socialist revolution; or we 
do not do this - and in that case we shall find 
ourselves isolated and we shall be abandoning 
the tactics of utilising every revolutionary 
movement among the oppressed nationalities for 
the purpose of destroying imperialism. We must 
support every movement directed against 
imperialism. 13
It was Lenin however who most forcefully and 
effectively established the necessary connection between 
'nationalism', 'oppression', and the imperative for 
communists to support 'every movement directed against 
imperialism'. In terms of consistency of theory and 
analysis, it is noteworthy that he made this connection at 
least as early as 1897. Addressing the subject in his 
essay 'The Tasks Facing Russia's Social Democrats', Lenin 
had urged his party to:
... support the progressive social classes 
against the reactionary classes, the bourgeoisie 
against the representatives of privileged 
landowning estate and the bureaucracy, the big 
bourgeoisie against the reactionary strivings of 
the petty bourgeoisie. This support does not 
presuppose, nor does it call for, any compromise 
with non-Social-Democratic programmes and 
principles - it is support given to an ally 
against a particular enemy ... the Social- 
Democrats render this support in order to
13. Stalin, op. cit., p 67. Stalin echoed the support 
of Marx and Lenin for Irish Home Rule in this 
passage: 'Is not the Irish movement against British
imperialism a democratic movement which is striking a 
blow at imperialism? And are we not to support the 
movement ?'
16
expedite the fall of the common enemy, but 
expect nothing for themselves from these 
temporary allies, and concede nothing to them.
14
Particularly interesting is the breadth of 
social categories included under the broad heading of 
'oppressed' groups, all of which were perceived as useful 
revolutionary allies. The emphasis placed at that early 
date on the necessity to protect class interests is also 
significant:
While pointing to the solidarity of one or other 
of the various opposition groups with the 
workers, the Social-Democrats will always single 
out the workers from the rest, they will always 
point out that this solidarity is temporary and 
conditional, they will always emphasise the 
independent class identity of the proletariat, 
who tomorrow may find themselves in opposition 
to their allies of today. 15
Finally, in a later essay, Lenin agreed with the authors 
of The Communist Manifesto that struggles for national 
self-determination could help the working class to acquire 
organisational strength and a greater sense of class
14. Lenin, 'The Tasks Facing Russia's Social-Democrats', 
Collected Works, London, 1960-1970, Vol. 2, p 334. 
Emphasis in original. The similarity to Marx's 
position as reflected in fn 7 and 8 above is obvious.
15. ibid, pp 334-335.
17
consciousness. On each of those issues his basic
position was therefore consistent with that of Marx and 
Engels.
Lenin in fact subsequently took the theoretical
development of the question of nationalism further than
had his two great predecessors. In 1914 he argued that,
when harnessed constructively, nationalism was an
17intensely democratic force. He went on to present an
economically-derived explanation of the reasons why 
socialists should support national self-determination, 
particularly in the East. First, he explained that the 
tendency of every national movement was towards the 
formation of national states, 'under which [the] 
requirements of modern capitalism are best satisfied'.
He then related this to the Asian situation, suggesting 
that while it was not possible to determine whether Asia 
would have time to develop into a system of nation states 
before the worldwide collapse of capitalism, it
16. Lenin, 'Karl Marx', Selected Works, Vol. 1, p 38
(July-November 1914). 'Nations are an inevitable 
product, an inevitable form, in the bourgeois epoch 
of social development. The working class could not 
grow strong, become mature and take shape without 
"constituting itself within the nation", without 
being "national" ("though not in the bourgeois sense 
of the word")'.
17. Lenin, 'The Right of Nations to Self-Determination', 
Selected Works, Vol. 1, p 600 (February-May 1914). 
'... the recognition of the right of all nations to 
self-determination implies the maximum of democracy 
...' Emphasis in original.
18
nevertheless remained an 'undisputed fact' that
capitalism, having awakened Asia, 'called forth national
movements everywhere in that continent'. Under those
circumstances, all classes of a population were drawn into
18politics to oppose feudalism and absolutism. In
essence, Lenin was arguing that those economic forces
identified by communists as leading inevitably to
socialism also underpinned oppressed peoples' urge for
national self-determination, in the process of which
momentous political agitation was generated.
Accordingly, nationalism could be viewed as an integral
part, within the Marxian analysis of society, of
progressive and universal socio-economic change.
At this stage a brief comment on Lenin's
approach to Marxism is necessary. There is in Marxism,
as well as a determinist element, an activist element
which is most readily apparent in the attention given to
the need for revolutionary agitation: although historical
development may be moving in a particular direction, it
can be given a good push through the dynamics of the class
struggle. While always remaining aware of the need for
19theoretical rigour, Lenin fully understood this dynamic: 
for him, the only purpose of theory was action. Changing 
objective circumstances had to be accommodated, and the
18. ibid, p 571.
19. See pp 5-6 above.
19
imperative was for action sooner rather than later. Like 
Marx, Lenin knew that the point was to change the world. 
Theory was not dogma, and new developments had to be 
confronted.
This approach was consistently reflected in 
Lenin's analyses of revolutionary prospects, in both 
Europe and Asia. When revolution in Russia in 1905 and 
the outbreak of World War in 1914 created profound social 
turmoil, the Bolshevik leader perceived the possibility of 
proletarian - as opposed to some sort of proletarian/ 
peasant or proletarian/bourgeois - revolution in its own 
right. However, on both occasions the socialist movement 
was unable to generate sufficient momentum from within 
itself. Given those circumstances, it was only to be 
expected that Lenin would seek to adjust his tactics in 
keeping with the activist element of Marxism.
Thus it was immediately after the failure of the
1905-07 uprising in Russia that he first suggested that
the Tsarist regime could be overthrown only by a
proletarian/peasant alliance. At about the same time,
and consistent with that thesis, Lenin began to pay
increased attention to revolutionary prospects in the
East, where any uprising would of course have to include
20the peasants if it were to succeed. At the Bolshevik
20. This was a function of Asia's stage of economic 
development, reflected in the limited number of 
industrial workers and the sheer weight of numbers of 
peasants.
20
Congress in January 1912 he moved a resolution
congratulating Sun Yatsen's Republicans on their overthrow
of the Manchu Dynasty in China, stating that '... the
Conference recognises the world-wide importance of the
revolutionary struggle of the Chinese people, which is
bringing emancipation to Asia and is undermining the rule
21of the European bourgeoisie'. This was followed in May
1913 by an article in Pravda entitled 'Backward Europe and
Advanced Asia', in which, apparently frustrated by the
comparative inactivity of the revolutionary forces in
Europe, Lenin contrasted the growth of the 'mighty
democratic movement' in Asia, where 'the bourgeoisie still
sides with the people against [the feudal] reaction', with
the revolutionary hopelessness of the bourgeoisie in 
22Europe.
The social turmoil which accompanied the 
outbreak of World War I revived Bolshevik hopes of 
widespread and spontaneous working class uprisings in 
Europe. When these failed to eventuate, Lenin again 
focused on the East. In what was perhaps his major 
theoretical treatise, 'Imperialism : the Highest Stage of 
Capitalism', written in 1916, he established the most 
explicit connection yet between nationalism in Asia and
21. Lenin, 'The Chinese Revolution', Collected Works, 
Vol. 17, p 485.
22. Lenin, 'Backward Europe and Advanced Asia', Collected 
Works, Vol. 19, p 99.
21
the international socialist movement. Whereas Marx had
viewed the national question primarily as a 'secondary and
subordinate' feature of the socialist revolution, Lenin
postulated a correlation between struggles for national
liberation and the worldwide struggle of the proletariat
and the oppressed. Indeed, he believed that to a
considerable extent the fate of the world revolution was
now linked to the East. The logic for this conclusion
rested on his perception of the changing revolutionary
potential of certain social groups. Lenin identified a
weakening of anti-capitalist sentiment and activity among
some sections of workers in advanced nations, where an
opportunistic 'aristocracy of labour' had been bribed away
from its true class interests by the super-profits of
24monopoly capital. In contrast to this, nationalist-
inspired anti-imperialist feelings in colonies were 
increasingly becoming a potent revolutionary force. 
'Imperialism' was synonymous with 'capitalism'; 
therefore, the national struggles in the colonies had to 
be accepted as an important element of the international
23. Lenin, 'Imperialism, the Highest Stage of 
Capitalism', Selected Works, Vol. 1, pp 634-731.
24. ibid, p 714: 'It must be observed that in Great
Britain the tendency [is for] imperialism to split 
the workers, to strengthen opportunism among them ... 
the "worst English trade unions ... allow themselves 
to be led by men sold to or at least paid by, the 
middle class"'.
22
struggle against capitalism. This perception naturally 
came to assume great theoretical significance for Asian 
revolutionaries.
In 1917, however, Asia again was temporarily
forgotten, this time because of the overthrow in Russia of
the Romanovs, and the apparently highly promising
revolutionary prospects in Europe generally and Germany in
particular. But by the end of 1919, the socialist
uprisings in Europe seemed to have lost their way, so
communist theorists once more looked eastwards. It is
most notable that on this occasion, Trotsky, who
previously had deeply mistrusted proposed alliances with
peasant movements, now exhorted the Central Committee of
the party to effect a radical reform of its policy
regarding Asia. On 5 August 1919, five days after the
collapse of Soviet Hungary, he argued that this defeat
would, 'in all probability, delay the workers' revolution
in the smaller countries: Bulgaria, Poland, Galicia,
25Romania and the Balkans'. Asking rhetorically how long
this situation might persist, he provided the answer 
himself, suggesting that it could be as long as five 
years. Because of that circumstance, he continued, 
attention should be turned towards Asia. In a now-famous 
passage, he suggested that 'The road to India may prove at
L. Trotsky, 'To the Central Committee of the R.C.P.', 
5 August 1919, in J.M. Meijer, (Ed.), The Trotsky 
Papers 1917-1922, (Vol. 1), The Hague, 1964, p 627.
25.
23
the given moment to be readily passable and shorter for us
2 6than the road to Soviet Hungary'. Trotsky had reached
the same conclusion regarding Asia as had Lenin, albeit 
via a different route.
The Bolsheviks' basic position was neatly 
summarised by Lenin during an interview with a Japanese 
journalist in June 1920, when he reiterated the tactic he 
had elaborated four years previously in 'Imperialism : the 
Highest Stage of Capitalism'. Replying to the question, 
'Where does Communism have the best chances for success - 
in the West or in the East?', he replied:
Genuine communism can thus far succeed only in 
the West. However, the West lives on account 
of the East. European imperialist powers 
support themselves mainly from Eastern colonies. 
But at the same time they are arming their 
colonials and teaching them to fight. Thereby 
the West is digging its grave in the East. 27
* * * *
That last quotation is a useful point at which 
to conclude this section, for it not only summarises most 
of the key issues, but also is attributed to the dominant 
figure of the early years of the Comintern. The comment
26. ibid, p 623.
27. Lenin, interview with journalist Fusse, quoted in 
S.W. Page, 'Lenin : Prophet of World Revolution from 
the East', in Russian Review, Vol. II, 1952, p 75.
24
was made at a time when the Red Army was under desperate 
pressure from hostile Western interventionist forces and 
the Whites, and the very survival of the Soviet revolution 
was at risk. Given the circumstances, it is significant 
to note that Lenin's essential theoretical stance was 
consistent with Marxist orthodoxy, viz. he maintained that 
'genuine communism' could only be achieved in economically 
and industrially advanced countries with their large 
populations of industrial workers. At the same time, in 
keeping with the activist element of Marxism, it was 
perfectly acceptable to agitate for change in the East. 
Marx and Engels had been by no means inflexible in 
translating their analysis of social change into tactics, 
and had argued on several occasions that 'interference' in 
the East could serve the dual progressive revolutionary 
purpose of smashing Oriental despotism - thereby releasing 
the irresistible forces of socio-economic change - and, by 
mobilising oppressed peoples, promoting socialist 
objectives. Within that particular framework, they 
supported nationalism and class cooperation, as long as 
proletarian class interests always remained foremost.
Marx and Engels, and Lenin, agreed that the leadership 
provided by the vanguard of the communist party would be 
crucial in securing those interests. Finally, through 
his powerful attack on imperialism, Lenin had presented an 
economically-derived rationale for the East to provide, in 
some respects, the lead in the world-wide socialist
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struggle. Communist theorists could reasonably claim, 
therefore, that they were justified in using nationalism 
and class cooperation as a means of promoting Marxist 
revolution in the East.
PART TWO; THE EARLY CONGRESSES
The First Congress of the Communist
International was held in Moscow in March 1919. It had
been organised hastily and, in the confusion following the
end of World War I, with a degree of ignorance on the part
of its Bolshevik organisers regarding circumstances in
other countries. Only 35 delegates with voting powers
attended, and according to the Comintern's first
secretary, Angelica Balabanova, most of those delegates
had been hand-picked by the Central Committee of the
2 8Russian Communist Party. As that party was represented
by Lenin, Trotsky, Zinoviev, Bukharin and Chicherin - all
of whom would have enjoyed tremendous revolutionary status
- the Bolsheviks inevitably dominated proceedings. This
29situation probably was not intended. However, a firm
28. See J. Degras, The Communist International, 1919- 
1943, Documents, (3 Vols.), London, 1956. This note 
is from Vol. 1, p 1.
29. ibid, p 37. 'Moscow was the obvious choice for the 
headquarters of [Comintern]; between congresses, the 
Executive Committee was to act in its name. It is 
clear from speeches and articles by the Russian
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link between the Comintern and Russian foreign policy was
almost unavoidably established from the outset and, as
will be discussed later, this eventually was of great
significance for Comintern policies in the East.
A large percentage of the First Congress's
energies was directed towards approving a new Communist
Manifesto, intended to succeed that written in 1848 by
Marx and Engels. Both this new manifesto and the
Congress's platform placed considerable emphasis on the
need to coordinate world-wide proletarian movements as the
only way of achieving a 'truly revolutionary, truly
30proletarian, communist international'. Delegates
agreed that the International must subordinate 'so-called
national interests to the interests of the international 
3 1revolution', presenting in their manifesto an appeal for 
a world-wide revolution which would transcend national 
frontiers because 'The national State, which imparted a 
mighty impulse to capitalist development, has become too 
narrow for the further development of productive
leaders at this time that they had every hope and 
intention of transferring the seat of the Executive 
to a western capital once conditions were favourable 
to such a move'.
30. 'Platform of the Communist International Adopted by 
the First Congress', Degras, op. cit., Vol. 1, p 23 
(March 1919 ) .
31. loc. cit.
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However, just as Marx and Engels before them had
appreciated the need to avoid stultifying dogmatism in the
translation of theory into practice, so too the
theoreticians of the Comintern were not inflexible. Thus
the Congress's platform spoke of the requirement, in the
first instance, for the 'destruction of the bourgeois
State machine and the construction of the proletarian
33State machine'; that is, notwithstanding the belief 
that social change ultimately would be based on 
international revolutionary forces, initially new 
socialist societies would arise on a national basis.
While this analysis related essentially to 
circumstances in Europe (as had Marx's Communist 
Manifesto), the delegates did not ignore the East. 
Reference was made both in the Congress platform and the 
new manifesto to the 'ferment in the colonies' and the 
exploitation by imperialist powers, not only of the 
working class, but also of peasants in 'oppressed 
colonies'. The section of the manifesto addressing the
32. 'Manifesto of the Communist International to the
Proletariat of the Entire World', Degras, op. cit., 
Vol. 1, p 42 (March 1919).
'Platform of the Communist ...', Degras, op. cit., 
Vol. 1, p 19. The intention was that the 
'proletarian State machine' would be based on 
popularly-elected people's councils, i.e. Soviets.
33.
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national and colonial question stated that 'the colonial
question in its fullest extent has been placed on the
agenda [for Comintern action]', but at the same time noted
that 'the emancipation of the colonies [would be] possible
only in conjunction with the emancipation of the
34metropolitan wTorking class'. This caveat was
reminiscent of one placed by Marx on his analysis of
revolutionary prospects in Russia : in 1882 he had
qualified his suggestion that socialist revolution might
first succeed in that country by stipulating that any such
uprising would have to be supported immediately by the
proletariat of the industrialised nations of Western 
35Europe. In the Asian case, the Comintern was
suggesting that the (anticipated) new proletarian states 
of Europe would be in the vanguard of the liberation of 
the colonies. The significance of this was twofold. 
First, the importance of nations and national action as 
the medium for initially promoting socialism in the East 
had been acknowledged by the Congress, and, second, the 
statement officially recognised the revolutionary primacy 
of European communist parties - which to all intents and 
purposes meant the Russian Communist Party.
34. 'Manifesto of the Communist ...', Degras, op. cit., 
Vol. 1, p 43. The manifesto was written by Trotsky 
and adopted unanimously.
35. See fn 5 above.
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The question of class cooperation received
little specific attention. Nevertheless, in the months
following the First Congress the issue did arise, albeit
fleetingly, from time to time: for example, a manifesto
from the Executive Committee of the Communist
International (ECCI) to the communist parties of Bulgaria,
Rumania, Serbia and Turkey in March 1920 reminded those
organisations of the 'necessity of drawing into the
communist movement the working peasantry, [and] the poor
3 6and middle peasants' as well as the proletariat.
* ★ * *
A far more catholic gathering assembled in 
Moscow in July 1920 for the Comintern's Second Congress. 
There were 217 delegates from 41 countries, including 
representatives from the important Asiatic states of 
China, Persia, Korea, Turkey and India.
This time the national and colonial question was 
one of the main items on the agenda. Debate on the 
question was dominated by Lenin and M.N. Roy, an Indian
'Extracts from a Manifesto to the Communist Parties 
of Bulgaria, Rumania, Serbia and Turkey', Degras, 
op. cit., Vol. 1, p 87.
The ECCI was elected by Congress to act as 
the Comintern's central committee between Congresses. 
President of the ECCI was the Russian revolutionary, 
G. Zinoviev.
36.
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considered by many to be the outstanding Asian Marxist.
Lenin presented his Preliminary Draft Theses on the
subject in which he sustained the thrust of his earlier
analyses : within certain identifiable constraints,
conditions in colonial states were suitable for Marxist-
37oriented revolutionary agitation. Consistent with his
exposition on imperialism, the Draft Theses defined the
general colonial revolutionary setting essentially in
terms of anti-imperialism, in which circumstances the
distinction between classes became less important than
that between 'oppressed' and 'oppressor' nations. Also
of note was the argument that, with the world socialist
movement currently prospering only in Russia - and indeed
in dire trouble in the rest of Europe - priority should be
given to securing some sort of support for the socialist 
3 8homeland. Lenin's Theses therefore proposed that the
Comintern should cooperate with any 'progressive' national 
movement. Strengthening such movements, in the interests
37. Lenin, 'Preliminary Draft Theses on the National and 
the Colonial Questions', Selected Works, Vol. 3, pp 
376-382. (Written in June 1920.)
38. ibid, p 378. 'World political developments are of 
necessity concentrated on a single focus - the 
struggle of the world bourgeoisie against the Soviet 
Russian Republic, around which are inevitably 
grouped, on the one hand, the Soviet movements of the 
advanced workers in all countries, and, on the other, 
all the national liberation movements in the colonies 
and among the oppressed nationalities, who are 
learning from bitter experience that their only 
salvation lies in the Soviet system's victory over 
world imperialism'.
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of gaining allies for the Soviet government, might for the 
moment be more important than either internationalism or 
the class composition of any alliance:
... one cannot confine oneself at present to a 
bare recognition or proclamation of the need for 
closer union between the working people of the 
various nations; a policy must be pursued that 
will achieve the closest alliance, with Soviet 
Russia, of all the national and colonial 
liberation movements. The form of this 
alliance should be determined by the degree of 
development ... of the bourgeois-democratic 
liberation movement of the workers and peasants 
in backward countries or among backward 
nationalities. 39
This perception underpinned one of Lenin's major
tactical propositions. Arguing that '... all Communist
parties should render direct aid to the revolutionary
movements among the dependent and underprivileged nations
40... and in the colonies', he made specific reference to 
cooperation with the bourgeoisie. Indeed, not only was 
assistance to be given, but also alliances were 
permissable:
The Communist International must enter into a 
temporary alliance with bourgeois democracy in 
the colonial and backward countries, but should 
not merge with it, and should under all 
circumstances uphold the independence of the 
proletarian movement even if it is in its most 
embryonic form. 41
3 9. loc. cit.
40. ibid, p 379.
41. ibid, p 381; q.v. p 380.
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Clearly, the notion of a united front between the 
proletariat and other anti-imperialist groups was central 
to Lenin's thesis for revolution in the East. He 
envisaged the communist-led revolution taking place in two 
phases. First there would be a nationalist phase in 
which all factions of the alliance would be active. The 
paramount quality of any alliance would be its capacity 
and will to complete both of the tasks required of a 
'nationalist' revolution, viz. anti-imperialism (the 
overthrow of foreigners) and anti-feudalism (the defeat of 
the landed gentry). An alliance not committed to both 
goals could be counter-productive. The second phase 
would be the socialist, in which only the proletariat 
would play a substantial revolutionary role. This total 
concept meant that, in the first instance, Lenin was 
concerned with the establishment of correct political, 
rather than economic, circumstances.
Lenin's concept for the East was essentially 
consistent with that which he had developed for and 
effected in Russia, where the two phases were the 
bourgeois-democratic (which had been completed by a 
worker-bourgeois-peasant alliance) and the socialist.
For all practical purposes, the 'national liberation' and 
'bourgeois-democratic' phases fulfilled the same purpose, 
viz. that of overthrowing the existing autocratic-feudal 
regime. The second phase of the 'dual' revolution
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postulated an advance to socialism without going through
the stage of capitalist development.
M.N. Roy took issue strongly with Lenin on the
matter of class alliances. Lenin's caveat regarding the
42'independence of the proletariat' in any alliance did
nothing to assuage Roy's objection to the proposition.
In his opinion there were two distinct anti-imperialist
movements in the colonies, the first consisting of
bourgeois-democratic nationalists who merely sought
political independence within the capitalist order, and
the second of oppressed landless peasants who were rising
4 3against their capitalist oppressors.
As was noted above, Lenin had in 1917 suggested
that, in certain circumstances and to a limited degree,
socialist revolutionaries in backward Asia might give a
44lead to the proletariat of the West. Roy took this
further, arguing that socialists in Europe in fact would 
not be able to overthrow the bourgeoisie until Asiatic 
countries had shrugged off the yoke of imperialism, for it 
was only through the profits from the colonies that the
42. See p 31 above.
43. Degras, Introduction to 'Theses on the National and 
Colonial Question adopted by the Second Comintern 
Congress', op. cit., Vol. 1, p 139. q.v. E.H. Carr, 
The Bolshevik Revolution, (3 Vols.), Vol. 3, 
Harmondsworth, 1966, p 256.
44 . See pp 20-22 above.
34
European bourgeoisie were able to 'buy off' their 
4 5proletariat. Accordingly, Roy maintained that the
'bourgeois-democratic' and 'oppressed' movements were 
inherently opposed, and any cooperation between them would 
be theoretically unsound and inimical to the long-term 
prospects of the East's oppressed peoples.
The Comintern thus was faced with a confront­
ation which raised questions of both theory and practice. 
Lenin promoted his thesis by reminding delegates of the 
need for tactical flexibility. Perhaps nowhere is his 
talent as a tactician better presented than in his 
trenchant essay '"Left-Wing" Communism : an Infantile
Disorder', published only weeks before the Second 
4 6Congress. That essay developed most forcefully Marx's
maxim that the imperative is not merely to interpret the
4 7world in various ways, but rather to change it. In a
characteristically vigorous passage, Lenin had dismissed 
those critics who, in his opinion, failed to appreciate 
the importance of adjusting tactics to meet changing 
objective circumstances:
45. Carr, op. cit., p.254. Roy's analysis ironically 
seems to have originated from, or at least owed a 
debt to, Lenin's treatise on 'Imperialism : the 
Highest Stage of Capitalism'. Roy had, however, 
given that analysis a particularly Asiatic/colonial 
interpretation.
46. Lenin, '"Left-Wing" Communism : an Infantile 
Disorder', Selected Works, Vol. 3, pp 293-363.
(27 April 1920.) This work also illustrates Lenin's 
intimidating capabilities as a polemicist.
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Naive and quite inexperienced people imagine 
that the permissability of compromise in 
general is sufficient to obliterate any 
distinction between opportunism, against 
which we are waging, and must wage, an 
unremitting struggle, and revolutionary 
Marxism, or communism ... [in] nature and 
society all distinctions are fluid ...
... to renounce in advance any change of 
tack, or any utilisation of a conflict of 
interests (even if temporary) among one's 
enemies, or any conciliation or compromise 
with possible allies (even if they are 
temporary, unstable, vacillating or 
conditional allies) - is that not ridiculous 
in the extreme? 48
He then quoted with approval the authors of the Communist
Manifesto: '"Our theory is not a dogma, but a guide to
4 9action, said Marx and Engels."'
As is the case in so much of Lenin's
contribution to Marxist debate, the focus (either
explicitly or implicitly) for maintaining revolutionary
integrity during periods of tactical adjustment was placed
on the need for 'correct' leadership, provided by the
50vanguard of the communist party. This leadership
47. See p 2 above.
48. Lenin, '"Left-Wing" Communism ...', Selected Works, 
Vol. 3, pp 334-335. Emphasis in original.
49. ibid, p 336. Emphasis in original.
50. Lenin, Selected Works, e.g. 'What is to be Done?', 
Vol. 1, pp 92-234 (1902); 'The Immediate Tasks of 
the Soviet Government', Vol. 2, pp 586-617 (April 
1918); 'Speech at the First All-Russia Congress of 
Economic Councils', Vol. 2, pp 658-664 (May 1918); 
'Report on the Party Programme [to the Eighth 
Congress of the R.C.P. (B) ]', Vol. 3, pp 112-156 
(March-April 1919); 'Economics and Politics in the 
Era of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat', Vol. 3, 
pp 232-240 (October 1919).
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in the case of the East would come from the Comintern.
In this particular debate it seems that many
Congress delegates considered Roy's analysis placed undue
51emphasis on events in Asia and this factor, in
combination with Lenin's forceful argument and
revolutionary stature, saw the Bolshevik leader's position
hold sway. At the same time, Roy's attack on open
alliances with bourgeois-democratic movements apparently
caused some unease. The outcome was that the Theses on
the National and Colonial Question which were adopted by
the Comintern on 28 July 1920 were almost a verbatim
transcription of Lenin's Preliminary Draft Theses, but,
where applicable, the phrase 'bourgeois-democratic'
movement was replaced by 'revolutionary liberation'
52movement. In Jane Degras' opinion this substitution
53was little more than a verbal expedient which in no 
sense altered the thrust of the Leninist notion of 
utilising nationalism and class alliances in the East.
The Comintern moved quickly to implement the 
Theses endorsed by the Second Congress. On 1 September 
1920 the ECCI convened a congress of the 'oppressed
51. Carr, op. cit., p 254.
52. 'Theses on the National and Colonial Question adopted 
by the Second Comintern Congress', Degras, op. cit., 
Vol. 1, pp 139-144.
Degras, Introduction to 'Theses on the National ...', 
op. cit., Vol. 1, p 139.
53.
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peoples of the East' in the city of Baku, on the Caspian
Sea, with the intention of coordinating the nationalist
revolutionary movements of the East with the socialist
revolutionary movements of Europe. Lenin's close
associate Zinoviev, who was president of the ECCI, was the
senior Comintern official present. Zinoviev delivered a
brilliant speech in which his appeal to a broad cross-
section of the audience was based on anti-imperialist
rather than socialist sentiments : the Comintern was, he
stated, ready to help any revolutionary struggle in the
campaign to liberate the East from French and English 
54capitalists. This was a sensible line to adopt, for
many of those present were revolutionary only in the sense 
that they were nationalists. Indeed, because of the 
politics of his audience, Zinoviev cast his net even wider 
by linking anti-imperialism in the East to the Islamic 
notion of holy war. According to the conference's 
official record, the Comintern president called on 
delegates to
... start on the organisation of a true and 
holy people's war against the robbers and 
oppressors. The Communist International 
turns today to the peoples of the East and 
says to them: 'Brothers, we summon you to a
54. 'Extracts from an ECCI Appeal on the Forthcoming 
Congress of Eastern Peoples at Baku : To the 
Oppressed Popular Masses of Persia, Armenia, and 
Turkey', Degras, op. cit., Vol. 1, pp 106-109.
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holy war, in the first place against English 
imperialism!' 55
The Times newspaper subsequently noted the 
incongruity of communists 'summoning the world of Islam to 
a jihad' P u t t i n g  aside the wry humour of this, it is 
noteworthy that in calling for a united front against 
imperialism, Zinoviev carefully avoided reference to the 
internal political differences currently dividing Muslim 
revolutionaries. In the short-term the Comintern's main 
ambition in the East was that of mobilising anti­
imperialist forces, and any class antagonisms within those 
forces could be dealt with later. Zinoviev's speech was 
we11-received.
* * * ★
Baku probably represented the high point of the 
Comintern's aspirations for and status in the East. A 
theoretical basis for revolutionary action had been 
established, endorsed by the Comintern Congress, and 
translated into tactics which seemed to offer the promise 
of quick results. The response in Baku had been 
encouraging.
55. Zinoviev, quoted in P. Hopkirk, Setting the East 
Ablaze, London, 1984, pp 108-109.
56. ibid, p 108.
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Clearly, however, while the tactics endorsed by
the Comintern were not inconsistent with Marxism, they
were dangerous, involving as they did class cooperation in
which 'the allies of today - the peasants, the bourgeois
nationalists, the social democrats - were the enemies of 
57tomorrow'. As the Bolsheviks were currently finding
out the hard way in Russia, these were tactics which could
quickly give rise to the classic confrontation between
5 8theory and practice, under which circumstances the 
pressures to adopt expedient solutions or theoretically 
questionable compromises could become overwhelming.
57. Lenin, 'The Tasks of the Russian Social-Democrats', 
Collected Works, Vol. 2, p 334 (1897). q.v. E.H. 
Carr, op. cit., p 259.
58. Almost as soon as they assumed power in Russia, the 
Bolsheviks faced enormous problems in dealing with 
their erstwhile allies, the peasants.
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CHAPTER III
REALITIES : ALLIANCES IN THE EAST
Even while the Comintern had been setting in 
place the policies and organisational structure it hoped 
would mobilise the nationalists of the East in support of 
the proletariat of the West, other forces were already 
applying immense constraints on Soviet Russia's - and, 
therefore, the Comintern's - capacity for independent 
action. Those constraints were arising, aptly enough, 
from irresistible economic pressures. After years of 
World War, revolution, foreign intervention and finally 
civil war, Russia's economy was close to collapse. The 
most graphic manifestation of this came with the appalling 
famine of 1920-21, during which millions died."*" As a 
reaction to this desperate circumstance, and consistent 
with his belief in tactical flexibility, Lenin had turned 
to the New Economic Policy (NEP) as a means by which 
economic activity in Soviet Russia might be revitalised. 
NEP essentially promoted entrepreneurship and the growth 
of small businesses by permitting a limited but
1. The famine caused enormous social dislocation.
'Millions of hungry survivors wandered [the country] 
in search of some sort of food' and 'untold millions' 
died as the famine was accompanied by outbreaks of 
diseases such as typhus. A. Nove, An Economic 
History of the USSR, Harmondsworth, 1976, p 86.
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nevertheless significant degree of capitalism in various 
areas of the economy^.
As an economic strategy NEP was an undoubted 
success. However, as was mentioned above, it carried 
with it ineluctable consequences for Russian foreign 
policy and, as a result of that, Comintern strategy. For 
NEP to succeed, the Soviet Government had to have 
continuing access to capitalist markets and resources for 
a considerable number of years. It was for that reason 
that on 16 March 1921 the Soviets signed a trade agreement 
with Great Britain. This was a crucial treaty, being the
first and most important of a number of agreements on 
which it would not be an overstatement to say the 
reconstruction of Russia depended. Among the other 
treaties which quickly followed, the Rapallo pact with 
Germany was particularly noteworthy, conferring as it did
3the dual benefits of trade and military cooperation. At 
about the same time, treaties were also concluded with
4Persia and Turkey. In the opinion of the Soviet 
Commissar for Foreign Affairs, Chicherin, these agreements
5denoted 'a turning point in Soviet foreign policy'.
2. For a detailed review of NEP, see Nove, op. cit., pp 
83-159.
3. See E.H. Carr, The Bolshevik Revolution, Vol. 3, 
Harmondsworth, 1966, pp 360-379.
4. The treaty with Persia was signed on 26 February 1921 
and that with Turkey on 16 March 1921.
5. Carr, op. cit., p 289.
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A number of the agreements contained some sort 
of undertaking by the Soviet Government to reduce 
revolutionary agitation in the geographic areas of 
influence and hegemony of the other party. The trade 
agreement with Great Britain was probably the most 
forcefully expressed, particularly in the clause which 
stated that:
... more particularly ... the Russian 
Soviet Government [will refrain] from 
any attempt by military or diplomatic or 
any other form of action or propaganda 
to encourage any of the peoples of Asia 
in any form of hostile action against 
British interests or the British Empire 
... 6
The decision to concentrate on reconstructing 
the Russian economy and buying some time for the embattled 
Soviet Government was soon reflected in Comintern 
resolutions and activities. Zinoviev's 60-page report on 
ECCI activities prepared for the Comintern's Third 
Congress in June 1921 contained a bare three sentences on
7the National and Colonial question. It also was as a 
corollary to NEP and the change in Soviet foreign policy 
that Lenin in an address to the Third Congress called for 
a temporary retreat from world revolution in order to calm
6. Quoted in Carr, op. cit., p 288.
7. See 'The Third Congress of the Communist 
International', Degras, op. cit., Vol. 1, pp 224-285; 
q.v. B. Lazitch and M.M. Drachkovitch, Lenin and the 
Comintern, Vol. 1, Stanford, 1972, p 415.
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capitalist misgivings about trading with Russia. Lenin 
advised the Congress delegates that
... we must take into account the fact 
that a certain equilibrium has now 
undoubtedly set in ... between the 
international bourgeoisie as a whole, 
and Soviet Russia. 8
This situation, he continued, had to be used to the 
communists' advantage:
We admit quite openly, and do not 
conceal the fact, that concessions in 
the system of state capitalism [i.e.
NEP] mean paying tribute to capitalism. 
But we gain time ... Our point of view 
is : for the time being - big 
concessions and the greatest caution, 
precisely because a certain equilibrium 
has set in, precisely because we are 
weaker than our combined enemies, and 
because our economic basis is too weak 
and we need a stronger one. 9
Yet again Lenin's theses 'On Tactics' received 
the overwhelming support of Congress. There was some 
opposition to his line, however, and it is worthy of 
mention. Within the Congress it was led once more by 
M.N. Roy, who was moved to deliver an 'energetic protest' 
against the manner in which the national and colonial 
question was being treated - or, rather, ignored. The 
consequences of NEP also drew into the open the
8. Lenin, 'Report on the Tactics of the R.C.P.', 
Collected Works, Vol. 32, p 478 (5 July 1921).
9. ibid, p 492 and p 496.
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dissatisfaction of the Tatar communist, Sultan-Galiev. 
Sultan-Galiev held a high position in the Soviet 
Commissariat of Nationality Affairs and on occasions 
worked closely with Lenin and Stalin. Like M.N. Roy, he 
was disturbed by the tactic of forming alliances with the 
national-bourgeoisie in Asia.
Despite his close connection to the Soviet 
communist hierarchy, Sultan-Galiev apparently from the 
earliest days of the Bolshevik revolution had harboured 
reservations regarding the capacity, or indeed the will, 
of any world proletarian movement to secure the liberation 
of colonial and semi-colonial peoples: he feared that
colonial domination would merely pass from one group of 
oppressors to another.^ His close connection to the 
leaders of the Russian revolution did not allay that 
suspicion. The introduction of NEP in Russia confirmed 
Sultan-Galiev's doubts, so he began to promote the 
proposition that liberation in Asia would only be possible 
if backward nations established dominance over 
industrialised states, apparently regardless of the socio­
economic system under which those states were governed:
We maintain that the formula which 
offers the replacement of the world-wide 
dictatorship of one class of European 
society (the bourgeoisie) by its 
antipode (the proletariat), i.e. by
R. Pipes, The Formation of the Soviet Union, 
Cambridge (Ma.), 1954, p 261.
10.
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another of its classes, will not bring 
about a major change in the social life 
of the oppressed segment of humanity.
At any rate, such a change, even if it 
were to occur, would not be for the 
better but for the worse ... In 
contradistinction to this we advance 
another thesis: the idea that the
material premises for a social 
transformation of humanity can be 
created only through the establishment 
of the dictatorship of the colonies and 
semi-colonies over the metropolises. 11
Sultan-Galiev accordingly called for the founding of a 
Colonial International as a counter to the Comintern, as 
the latter was of course intended ultimately to serve the 
industrial workers.
It is noteworthy that, like M.N. Roy, Sultan-
Galiev was unable to mobilise worthwhile support, which
indicates the general acceptance within the international
communist movement of the Comintern line. Sultan-
Galiev' s actions made him persona non grata with the
12Soviet hierarchy, and he soon faded from the scene.
Further endorsement of the Comintern's position 
was given by the delegates to the First Congress of
11. Sultan-Galiev, quoted in Pipes, op. cit., p 261.
12. There is an interesting footnote to Suitan-Galiev's
fall from grace, for, according to Trotsky, he was 
the first high ranking Soviet official to be purged 
by Stalin. Trotsky mentioned this while relating a 
conversation he once had with Lenin's former close 
associate, Kamenev: '"Do you remember the arrest of
Sultan-Galiev, the former chairman of the Tatar 
Council of People's Commissars in 1923?" Kamenev 
continued. "This was the first arrest of a prominent 
Party member made upon the initiative of Stalin. 
Unfortunately Zinoviev and I gave our consent to 
it."' L. Trotsky, Stalin, London, 1947, p 417.
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Communist and Revolutionary Organisations of the Far East 
which convened in Moscow in January 1922. Delegates 
formally accepted the theses of the Second Comintern 
Congress on the National and Colonial question. They 
made a particular point of acknowledging the current 
importance, given the prevailing circumstances, of forming 
alliances with the national-bourgeoisie, by urging 
communists to support every national revolutionary 
movement as a means of making the first inroads against 
imperialism. In general terms the 'Theses' of the 
Second Congress remained as the basis of Comintern policy, 
but, because of the need to protect Soviet Russia's 
trading interests, that policy would now be applied more 
cautiously than perhaps was originally intended.
* * * *
The tactic of the 'united front' was neither 
illogical nor theoretically reprehensible. Nevertheless 
it carried with it a number of considerable dangers, 
which, it seems, were either ignored or not identified by 
the Comintern. One of those dangers, already touched on 
in Chapter II, was that of accepting as today's allies 
those who would most probably be tomorrow's enemies. 
Because a certain degree of trust is necessary if a united 
front is to function, the participants become mutually 
vulnerable to betrayal. To assume in this situation that 
one's ally is less capable of manipulating and manoeuvring
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outside the alliance to safeguard or secure vital 
interests is both naive and foolish; and yet, as will be 
discussed later in this Chapter, the Comintern seems to 
have been guilty of making this assumption in a number of 
alliances formed with nationalist groups in Asia. The 
crucial question the Comintern never addressed properly 
was: what did the nationalists with whom they sought
alliances want in the long-term - what were their ultimate 
objectives? Only through a thorough understanding of 
their potential allies could the Comintern answer that 
question, and so provide the kind of leadership that, as 
their theoretical debates had acknowledged, would be 
essential.
Another tactical challenge which had to be 
resolved once alliances were formed was that of deciding 
whether or not to support a weak and ineffectual local 
communist party, with few apparent long-term revolutionary 
prospects, in preference to a strong nationalist group 
which clearly presented an immediate challenge to 
imperialist powers, but which might become strongly anti­
socialist should it acquire power.
Finally, the question of local conditions 
throughout the East remained unanswered. The fact was 
that the Comintern had endorsed a plan of action which it 
related to the East in its entirety. This was all right 
as far as it went, but much more attention to detail was 
needed: India was not China, China not Turkey, Turkey not
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Indo-China, and so on. The belief that one basic set of 
tactics would be applied in all oppressed countries, with 
little adjustment for local circumstances, was 
inconsistent with the dynamic element of Marxism. Here, 
it seems that men who in the main had realised the need 
for specific revolutionary tactics to meet Russia's 
specific conditions and needs in 1917, were now guilty of 
the (not uncommon) failing of generalising about foreign 
countries in terms they would not accept for their own 
country. At the very least, the failure to determine the 
particular requirements of each oppressed state was 
indicative of a sorry lack of knowledge on the part of 
Comintern officials of conditions in Asia.
The major effects of Comintern policies on 
socialist revolutionary movements in the East are reviewed 
in the remainder of this Chapter. Reference is made 
primarily to the movements in Turkey, China and Vietnam, 
which between them, from the time of the First Comintern 
Congress in 1919 to the Seventh Congress in 1935, 
experienced most of the consequences of those policies.
★ * * *
Comintern officials had appreciated the 
opportunities existing in the Near East in general and 
Turkey in particular from the time of the First Congress. 
Their interest rested on good, practical grounds, for it
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was clear that, in backward states like Persia and Turkey, 
Islam was one of the few social forces with the strength 
and coherence seriously to challenge Western hegemony. 
Turkey especially appealed as a likely ally, for the peace 
terms imposed on that country by the West following World 
War I included, inter alia, the granting of free access 
to the Black Sea for all nations: this condition
humiliated the Turks and threatened the Russians, thus 
setting the stage for an otherwise somewhat improbable 
liaison.
The most prominent Turkish leader, Kemal
Ataturk, was not a socialist. His belief in Turkish
'republicanism, nationalism and secularism' found its
antecedents in the classical bourgeois parliamentary
democracy of the West. At the same time, Kemal was no
reactionary and indeed was in some respects a radical
reformer. His policies were for their times
unquestionably progressive, including as they did a
commitment to breaking the power of the Muslim clergy and
13modernising the Turkish economy. Among the extremely
significant reforms contained in Kemal's programme were 
those relating to the emancipation of women, education, 
national self-determination for minorities in the former
13. For detailed comment on Kemal's political philosophy, 
see E.Z. Karal, 'The Principles of Kemalism', in A. 
Kazancigil and E. Ozbudun, Ataturk : Founder of a 
Modern State, Hamden, 1981, pp 11-35.
50
Turkish Empire, industrialisation, and the modernisation
of governmental administrative practices. Those reforms
were similar to part of the programme already being
14introduced in Soviet Russia by the Bolsheviks, so it was
not surprising that Russian officials found no great
difficulty in making common cause with Kemal. For his
part, the pragmatic Kemal was keen to secure Soviet
diplomatic support for his efforts to rebuild Turkey in
the face of Western opposition.
Not all Russian officials supported the
proposition of an alliance with Kemal. Stalin, for
example, was suspicious from the start, believing that the
Turkish leader was always likely to double-cross the
communists by turning towards the Entente once he had
achieved his nationalist objectives: the Georgian
expressed the fear that Kemal might 'betray the cause of
15the liberation of the oppressed peoples'.
14. Carr, op. cit., p 248.
15. Stalin made this comment during an interview with
Pravda which appeared on 30 November 1920. Carr, 
op. cit♦, p 301, fn 3. Some years later in a 'Talk 
with Students of the Sun Yat-Sen University', Stalin 
elaborated on his assessment of the nature of Kemal's 
revolution : 'A Kemalist revolution is possible only
in countries like Turkey, Persia or Afghanistan, 
where there is no industrial proletariat, or pract­
ically none, and where there is no powerful agrarian- 
peasant revolution. A Kemalist revolution is a 
revolution of the top stratum, a revolution of the 
national merchant bourgeoisie, arising in a struggle 
against the foreign imperialists, and whose sub­
sequent development is essentially directed against 
the peasants and workers, against the very possi­
bility of an agrarian revolution'. J. Stalin,
Works, (13 Volumes), Vol. 9, Moscow, 1952-1955, p261.
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Stalin's choice of words is interesting, as the
emphasis on 'oppressed peoples' rather than, say, Soviet
Russia or the Comintern, suggests that the motives for
joining in an alliance with the Turkish nationalists were
not opportunistic, but consistent with Comintern
objectives and tactics. In fact the alliance signed
between Soviet Russia and Turkey on 16 March 1921 was
framed in terms of the 'struggle against imperialism', in
which 'the mutual affinity between the national liberation
movement of the peoples of the East and the struggle of
16the workers of Russia for a new social order' was seen 
as a natural bond.
The alliance with Kemal undoubtedly strengthened 
the anti-imperialist forces in the Near East, but it also 
undermined the Turkish Communist Party. Here, the harsh 
but inescapable fact the Comintern had to accept was that 
the Turkish Communist Party was weak, unpopular and 
ineffectual. Following the Second Comintern Congress and 
the Baku Congress, the Turkish delegates on returning to 
their homeland had been executed by public mobs. With 
the Turkish Communist Party by itself clearly having few 
prospects, the decision to form an alliance with the 
nationalists must have seemed rational to the Comintern.
It was at the same time a callous decision. Obliged to 
limit its anti-capitalist agitation, and in the perceived
16. Carr, op. cit. , p 303 (the quotation only).
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interests of furthering the world-wide socialist 
revolution, the Comintern had little choice other than 
effectively to abandon the Turkish party in favour of 
Kemal once the alliance was formalised.
In terms of Comintern policy the Russo-Turkish 
alliance succeeded to the extent that Kemal, by mobilising
Turkish nationalism, forced the abrogation of the Treaty
17of Sevres, which in turn amounted to a considerable 
defeat for the capitalist powers. However, having 
achieved this objective, Kemal no longer needed the 
diplomatic support of the Soviet Government. Determined 
to remove any potential opposition, he instigated a 
campaign of the most severe persecution against the 
Turkish communists, from which they never recovered.
There is little evidence that the Comintern 
seriously considered changing its tactics after the 
Turkish experience. Admittedly there were suggestions of 
remorse, at least in relation to individual suffering, in 
the letter sent by the Fourth Comintern Congress to the 
Turkish Communist Party exhorting them to continue the 
struggle:
17. The Peace Treaty of Sevres of 10 August 1920 had been 
signed by the Turkish government but never ratified 
by their Parliament. It effectively dismembered the 
Ottoman Empire and gave Greece, Turkey's most 
despised enemy, authority over some previously 
Turkish-dominated territory. The Treaty also 
permitted the occupation of key Turkish centres (e.g. 
Constantinople) by allied forces.
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Arrested comrades! The Communist 
International, as the general staff and 
defender of the entire world 
proletariat, greets in you with the 
greatest warmth the class conscious and 
most devoted representatives of the 
Turkish working masses.
Do not forget, comrades, that the 
darkness of prison can never blot out 
the sun of revolution.
Do not forget, comrades, that on the eve 
of the victory of the revolution the 
powerlessness of the ruling class is 
expressed in their greater brutality. 18
However, well-intentioned encouragement was the 
limit of the Comintern's reaction. During the discussion 
at the Fourth Congress on the Eastern question, Radek's 
summary on the outcome of the alliance with Kemal made it 
clear that the tactical approach to revolution in the East 
would remain unchanged:
We do not for a moment regret telling 
the Turkish communists that their first 
task after the formation of the party 
was to support the national liberation 
movement ... Even now, with the 
persecutions, we say to our Turkish 
comrades, do not let the present moment 
blind you to the near future. Defend 
yourself against your persecutors ... 
but do not forget that historically the 
time has not yet come to take up the
18. 'Open Letter to the Communists and Working People of 
Turkey Adopted at the Fourth Comintern Congress', 
Degras, op. cit., Vol. 1, pp 380-381 (20 November 
1922 ) .
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decisive battle; you still have far to 
go. 19
A similar theme was pursued by Bukharin at the Twelfth 
Congress of the Russian Communist Party when he made the 
point that, despite their persecution, the Turkish 
communists were playing a revolutionary role by
20contributing to the destruction of imperialism.
The experience in Turkey was subsequently 
repeated in Persia where, in the interests of forming an 
anti-imperialist alliance with nationalist forces, the 
Comintern and the Soviet Government once more abandoned 
the comparatively weak local communist party.
Whether or not Comintern and Soviet complicity 
in the rise to power of two nationalist governments at the 
expense of the colonial powers would serve the interests 
of international socialism to the extent anticipated 
remained to be seen. What was immediately obvious, 
however, was that the Comintern's tactics had in the Near 
East abetted the destruction of two local communist 
parties.
* * * *
19. Radek, quoted in Degras, Introduction to 'Open Letter 
to the Communists ...', op. cit., Vol. 1, p 380.
Radek was a leading figure in the Bolshevik 
hierarchy. Of Polish-German origins, he had made 
his name originally through his revolutionary 
pamphlets and his belief in internationalism.
20. loc. cit.
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First-hand contact between Comintern agents and 
Chinese communists first occurred in the spring of 1921, 
through the Comintern's Asian branch at Irkutsk in 
Siberia. This meeting almost coincided with the formal 
establishment of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) which, 
at its foundation congress and in the presence of a 
Comintern representative, passed a resolution adopting the 
Leninist organisational model and Marxist-Leninist 
objectives. Soviet Russia enjoyed tremendous 
revolutionary status with the Chinese communists, and the 
influence conferred by that status was reflected in the 
constitution endorsed by this first All-China Soviet 
Congress:
The Soviet Government in China declares 
its readiness to form a revolutionary 
united front with the world proletariat 
and all oppressed nations, and proclaims 
the Soviet Union3 the land of 
proletarian dictatorshipto he its 
loyal ally. 21
This amounted to an acceptance of the Comintern 
programme for revolution in Asia. Similarly, the CCP saw 
no reason to disagree with the Comintern over its analysis 
of the revolutionary circumstances obtaining in China. 
Comintern theorists held that China was not yet ready for 
a socialist revolution, so it would be the CCP's task to
21. Quoted in E. Snow, Red Star Over China, London, 1973, 
p 353. Emphasis in original.
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assist with the completion of the necessary bourgeois 
22revolution. This would be achieved through the
accepted tactic of class cooperation within nationalist 
movements. In the specific Chinese case the nationalist 
alliance was to work for the dual goals of national 
unification and independence. The Comintern leaders 
believed, not unreasonably, that a movement of national 
unity would provide a framework within which the oppressed 
workers and peasants of China would be able to develop 
socialist awareness through the process of throwing off 
the yoke of feudalism, while the attainment of Chinese 
national independence by definition would mean a defeat 
for imperialism.
Putting those ideas into practice meant almost 
inevitably that an alliance would have to be formed with 
the most powerful nationalist party, the Guomindang 
(Kuomintang) led by Dr Sun Yatsen. An alliance 
accordingly was concluded in January 1924. From the 
outset this arrangement reflected the Comintern's 
appalling ignorance of the CCP, the Guomindang and 
conditions in China. The basic theory behind the
22. 'Theses on the Eastern Question Adopted by the Fourth 
Comintern Congress', Degras, op. cit., Vol. 1, 
pp 382-393 (November 1922). See especially Point 
VII, 'The Tasks of the Proletariat in the Countries 
of the Pacific', pp 391-392. q.v. Degras, 
Introduction to 'Theses of the ECCI on the 
Forthcoming Washington Conference', op. cit., Vol. 1, 
pp 285-287 (August 1921).
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Comintern policy may have been sound enough, but, as had 
also been the case in Turkey, the particular circumstances 
to which that theory was being applied simply were not 
understood well enough. There is little doubt that China 
was becoming ready for some sort of socio-political 
change, but the situation there was so complex that the 
most astute and informed leadership clearly was a sine qua 
non of success. Regrettably for the CCP, the Comintern 
did not manifest those qualities, particularly when it 
came to the matter of understanding the Guomindang.
The fact was that under Sun Yatsen the
Guomindang's social objectives - while unquestionably an
improvement on those of the Manchus and the colonial
powers - were strictly limited, expressed as they were in
vague terms of improving 'people's livelihood' and
23aspiring to 'social betterment'. There was even less
cause for confidence regarding the nature of the 
Guomindang once Sun Yatsen was succeeded as leader by 
General Jiang Kaishek (Chiang Kai-shek) in 1925. Jiang
23. As C.P. FitzGerald has observed, 'It is true that Dr 
Sun's three principles, the basic doctrine of his 
party, included in the third, people's livelihood, a 
vague and imprecise aspiration to social betterment. 
But whether this principle meant in practice 
Socialism, the Welfare State, or merely some measures 
of modern hygiene, better communications and other 
accompaniments of a developed capitalist society, was 
left obscure ... It was not on democracy that the new 
revolutionary appeal was based, but on nationalism'. 
C.P. FitzGerald, Revolution in China, London, 1952, 
pp 50-51.
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had no real notion of reform. He ascribed the evils 
affecting China solely to foreign imperialism, ignoring 
the possibility of any deep-seated national social 
malaise: his vision of political life in China after a
nationalist revolution was little different to the system 
he wished to supplant, save that feudal power would be 
exercised by a Guomindang central government instead of 
regional warlords and foreigners. That most bourgeois of 
institutions, parliamentary democracy, was not on his 
agenda; indeed, in many respects Jiang's promotion of
24militarism and authoritarianism most resembled fascism.
If the Guomindang seemed to offer promise in terms of 
achieving the first task - viz. anti-imperialism - of the 
nationalist phase of China's revolution, it offered 
nothing as far as the second task of anti-feudalism was 
concerned. From a reformist/revolutionary perspective 
this would appear to have made the organisation a dubious 
proposition. At the very least, its members needed to be 
treated with great caution. The moribund nature of a 
party based on only one belief - nationalism - was 
succinctly captured by C.P. FitzGerald when he wrote:
Nationalism was not enough ... Democracy 
was manifestly not the ideal or the 
practice of the [Guomindang] regime; it 
repudiated the past, yet seemed to 
hanker after Confucianism; it was not 
Christian, although many of its leaders
24 . Jiang's political philosophy is set out in Jiang 
Kaishek, China's Destiny, London, 1947.
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were baptised Christians. To what end, 
to what vision of the future, the 
Kuomintang progressed, no one really 
knew. Not many of its members cared. 25
Notwithstanding this, the Comintern threw its
full support behind Jiang Kaishek. Russian weapons,
money and military advisers were sent to the Guomindang,
while officers from the party, including the General
himself, went to Moscow for training. The Guomindang was
even given associate membership of the Executive of the 
2 6Comintern. Leadership of the united front in China was
placed firmly in Guomindang hands, as Zinoviev 
acknowledged in a telegram sent to Jiang Kaishek following 
the General's accession to the leadership:
The Executive of the Communist 
International will do everything in its 
power to explain to the broad working 
masses of all countries the significance 
of Sun Yat-sen's work. It is convinced 
that all sections of the Communist 
International will give support to the 
Kuomintang party, which will carry Sun 
Yat-sen's cause to a successful end ...27
This sentiment was faithfully echoed by the CCP, who in 
the manifesto issued by their Third Congress accepted that 
'... the KMT should be the central force of the revolution
25. FitzGerald, op. cit., p 71.
26. I. Deutscher, Stalin, Harmondsworth, 1966, p 395.
27. 'Telegram from Zinoviev to the Kuomintang on the 
Death of Sun Yat-Sen', Degras, op. cit., Vol. 2, pp 
182-183 ( 14 March 1925 ) .
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2 8and should assume its leadership'.
The Guomindang-CCP alliance was most successful
in achieving national unification, for by early 1927 its
forces had occupied the key centres of the North and the
authority of the new central government was generally
accepted. Benefit had also been derived by the
communists in terms of numbers of active members, for in
six years the membership of the CCP had grown from less
29than 100 to over 58,000. It was at this stage,
however, that the militarily far stronger Guomindang
decided to move against its communist associates, whose
ideas and values had always been anathema to Jiang
Kaishek, and whose support he no longer needed.
Jiang acted ruthlessly, his intention being to
destroy the CCP as an alternative government. Ironically
the massacre began in Shanghai, which not three weeks
before the communists had helped capture. The CCP was no
match for the overwhelmingly superior forces of the
Guomindang: M.N. Roy assessed that about 25,000 bona fide
and alleged communists were killed in the spring of 1927,
in a savage campaign from which the party did not recover 
30for many years. Having routed the communists, Jiang
28. 'Extracts from ECCI Instructions to the Third 
Congress of the Chinese Communist Party', Degras, 
op. cit.,, Vol. 2, p 25 (May 1923).
29. M. Meisner, Mao's China, New York, 1977, p 25.
30. M.N. Roy, Revolution and Counter-Revolution in China, 
Calcutta, 1946, p 570.
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Kaishek began to implement policies which clearly- 
identified him as being little more than another feudal 
ruler, albeit one who had largely succeeded in unifying 
China and establishing some degree of national 
independence. Those policies had never, of course, been 
secret. Basically, Jiang maintained the status quo in 
the countryside, reached mutual agreement with those 
warlords who remained powerful, and concluded more 
favourable arrangements with the occupying imperialist 
powers.
It must be stressed that this disastrous reverse 
did not necessarily invalidate the theoretical analysis 
which underpinned the CCP-Guomindang alliance. The 
Comintern's failure was not so much one of theory, but 
rather one of tactics and leadership. Quite simply, the 
Comintern seemed out of touch with reality and incapable 
of reading clear warning signs that tactical flexibility 
was demanded. One prime example of this came in the wake 
of the shooting of a number of Chinese demonstrators by 
foreign troops in Shanghai in 1925 following an anti­
colonial protest. Chinese from a wide social spectrum 
were outraged by the foreigner's actions, to the extent 
that a wave of radical dissent broke out in numerous 
important centres. As a consequence of this new 
movement, workers' and peasants' organisations not only 
grew in size rapidly, but also began to make demands for 
change which far exceeded those endorsed by the Comintern
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in the alliance with the Guomindang. However, analysts
in far-off Moscow had no real appreciation of the extent
of this radicalisation, and instructed the CCP to curb the
movement. The Comintern assessment was that China was
not ready for radical change, that circumstances were not
right for social revolution, and that nothing should be
done which might place at risk the nationalist movement.
CCP officials thus found themselves instructed to inhibit
popular social agitation in the interests of preserving 
31the alliance.
Equally blinkered was the Comintern's 
understanding of the essential nature of the Guomindang. 
This failing was most apparent in the gross under­
estimation made of the capabilities of the organisation's 
leadership. Early in 1927 Chinese communists had become 
keenly aware that the Guomindang might turn against them 
at any moment. There were good reasons for the CCP to be 
nervous, for in March 1926 Jiang Kaishek had ordered the
arrest of numerous Soviet political advisers and communist
32political commissars working with the Guomindang. Some
31. 'Extracts from a Manifesto of the ECCI, Rilu, and YCI 
against Imperialist Atrocities in China', Degras,
op. cit. , Vol. 2, pp 218-220 (8 June 1925 ).
Addressing the 14th CPSU Congress after the Shanghai 
incident, Zinoviev stated 'There was a tendency 
[within the CCP] ... of carrying the movement to an 
acute phase, even to armed insurrection. The 
Comintern gave a directive against these moves'.
32. Degras, Introduction to 'Extracts from the Resolution 
of the Sixth ECCI Plenum on the Chinese Question',
op. cit., Vol. 2, pp 275-279 (13 March 1926).
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CCP leaders had been so alarmed they had proposed a pre­
emptive attack then and there. Despite some uneasiness 
Comintern officials held firm to the line that the 
alliance would be the springboard for dealing the 
necessary 'blow ... at the economic foundations of 
imperialist power' and therefore should be preserved at 
almost any cost. It is interesting to note that the
arrests were never mentioned in either the communist press
33or ECCI resolutions.
At the start of 1927 the CCP again suggested
that it was time to break the alliance, but the Comintern,
working through its agent Mikhail Borodin, insisted that
circumstances were not suitable: the nationalist front
had more to achieve before the communists would be in a
position to 'seize power from within'. So strong was the
Comintern's commitment to the united front that in early
April 1927 it went so far as to advise CCP officials to
bury or hide the weapons of their more radical factions in
order to circumvent the possibility of an attack on the 
34Guomindang. It was only days after this extraordinary
advice that Jiang Kaishek turned his troops against the 
CCP.
An interesting analysis of the Comintern's 
failure was made by Leon Trotsky in 1928. Trotsky at
33. ibid, p 276.
34. Snow, op. cit., p 163.
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that time was engaged in an ideologically-derived power 
struggle with Stalin, so his objectivity may be questioned 
as Stalin was intimately associated with Comintern policy. 
Nevertheless, Trotsky's analysis contains much logic. In 
his opinion the Comintern had become preoccupied with 
completing the nationalist phase of the revolution, to the 
detriment of the ultimate objective of their involvement 
in China, viz. socialist revolution. He argued that:
This goal [of socialism] could be 
achieved only if the revolution did not 
halt merely at the solution of the 
bourgeois-democratic tasks but continued 
to unfold, passing from one stage to the 
next, i.e. continued to develop 
uninterruptedly (or permanently) and 
thus lead China toward a socialist 
development. This is precisely what 
Marx understood by the term 'permanent 
revolution'. How can we, on the one 
hand, speak of a non-capitalist path of 
development for China and, on the other, 
deny the permanent character of the 
revolution in general? 35
Trotsky was suggesting that the Comintern leadership had 
been guilty of tactical ineptitude, which in turn 
prevented it from proceeding along the path of permanent 
revolution which he had in 1906 identified as a pre­
requisite for a Marxist revolution in a backward state, 
and which Lenin had implemented in 1917.
35. L. Trotsky, 'Summary and Perspectives of the Chinese 
Revolution', in The Third International after Lenin, 
(3rd Ed.), New York, 1970, pp 188-189.
65
The difference between Russia in 1917 and China
in 1927 was that the Comintern's determination to support
the Guomindang nationalists - whose notions of social
reform were as much feudal as bourgeois-democratic -
locked them into a stagnant alliance. The importance of
opposing one's temporary allies 'in all points where the
interests [of the revolutionary masses] arise', and of
always remembering that 'the proletariat is a class apart,
which tomorrow may be opposing its allies of today' seemed
3 6to have been forgotten or ignored. In short, the
Comintern's leaders had failed to follow the guidance of
Marx and Lenin concerning the necessity in any alliance to
protect the independent class interests of the
revolutionary masses. They had 'merged' with the
Guomindang instead of 'upholding [the] independence' of 
37their forces.
* * * *
Notwithstanding the failures in Turkey and 
China, this essay has been suggesting that the Comintern's 
basic concept for revolution in Asia was not necessarily 
wrong. In fact, until the united front policy was 
abruptly turned on its head by the Comintern's Sixth
36. See pp 10-11 and p 16 above.
37. See p 31 above.
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Congress in 1928, communist revolutionaries in Vietnam 
led by Ho Chi Minh had been enjoying considerable success 
by skilful application of precisely that concept.
While China and Vietnam were both encompassed by 
the Comintern's broad definition of the 'Far East' and 
'colonial and semi-colonial countries', marked differences 
existed between their respective socio-political 
conditions - a factor of the utmost significance. To a 
fair extent the circumstances in Vietnam were more 
favourable to the communists. Instead of having to 
confront the complex combination of feudal warlords and a 
variety of occupying powers, the nationalists in Vietnam 
were able to focus squarely on the one major enemy, 
colonial France. Further, while a number of influential 
bourgeois nationalist parties emerged to oppose the 
French, none ever achieved the dominance ultimately 
enjoyed by the Guomindang; thus, Vietnamese communists 
had more scope for taking the initiative than did their 
Chinese counterparts. The astute 'on-the-spot' 
leadership provided by Ho Chi Minh was another most 
significant factor (Mao Zedong's remarkable influence on 
the CCP was not felt until several years after the 1927 
massacre). Many more complex issues naturally were 
involved, but those mentioned above provided a basis from 
which the Vietnamese communists - unlike their 
contemporaries in Turkey and China - were able to take the 
lead in revolutionary activities, at least in the sense of
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planning, organising and controlling events.
Before discussing the tactics used by the
Vietnamese communists, some brief comments on Ho Chi
Minh's revolutionary perspectives are warranted because of
the extraordinary influence he exerted on events in Indo- 
3 8China. The criticism is sometimes made of the
Vietnamese leader that he was motivated more by patriotism
- i.e. nationalism - than by any commitment to 
39communism. It is true that patriotism initially drew
Ho Chi Minh to Marxism-Leninism : in one of his earliest
essays he wrote that he admired Lenin as a 'great
patriot'. The Bolshevik leader's 'Theses on the National
and the Colonial Questions' made a particular impact in
this regard, for within its implacable hostility to
imperialism Ho Chi Minh saw 'the path to our [Vietnamese]
liberation'. As he later stated, the initial attraction
4 0lay in the notion of liberation, not communism.
However, this early perception of Marxism-Leninism did not
38. Ho Chi Minh used many aliases during his lifetime, 
and for most of the period reviewed in this essay was 
known as Nguyen Ai Quoc. Here, however, the better- 
known name, which he adopted in July 1942, is used.
39. In 1933 Ho Chi Minh's book The Road to Revolution was 
attacked, apparently with the Comintern's approval, 
as 'a document which reeks of Nationalist stench'. 
Huynh Kim Khanh, Vietnamese Communism 1925-1945, 
Ithaca, 1982, p 184.
40. Ho Chi Minh, 'The Path which led me to Leninism', in 
On Revolution, London, 1967, pp 5-7.
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endure. Through his involvement with anti-imperialist
organisations in Europe, Ho Chi Minh's political
perspectives became more radical: he began to believe
that colonisation had been built and sustained by
violence, and could be overcome only by violence. As he
became increasingly politicised, Ho Chi Minh turned more
to the revolutionary content of Marxism-Leninism:
gradually he 'came upon the fact that only Socialism and
Communism [could] liberate the oppressed peoples and the
41working people throughout the world from slavery'.
An important aspect of this radicalisation was
his belief in universal revolutionary action, evident in
the preceding quotation. Internationalism was a central
issue to Ho Chi Minh, and his essays and speeches
consistently reflected a commitment to worldwide social
and economic change. At the Fifth Comintern Congress
held in Moscow in mid-1924 he criticised delegates for
42their inactivity in the whole colonial sphere. It is
also important to note that as early as 1922 he had 
identified the potential long-term danger nationalism 
posed to communists - a perception which doubtless would 
have subsequently been sharpened by the way in which the 
Guomindang turned against the CCP in 1927. The point 
here is that Ho Chi Minh's development as a revolutionary
41. ibid, pp 6-7.
42. Degras, Introduction to'Extracts from a Manifesto to 
the Peoples of the East issued by the Fifth Comintern 
Congress', op. cit. , Vol. 2, p 156 (July 1924 ).
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left him exceedingly well-placed to appreciate the 
pitfalls likely to be encountered during nationalist-based 
alliances of convenience.
When it came to the question of tactics, Ho Chi 
Minh was no different from Lenin (and, later, Mao Zedong) 
in not allowing himself to be circumscribed by rigid 
adherence to doctrine, particularly during the first stage 
of the revolution when the emphasis in a colonial or semi­
colonial country had to be on political rather than 
economic change. Ho Chi Minh fully appreciated the 
importance of revolutionary theory but, at the same time, 
like Lenin, he also believed that the only purpose of 
theory was action. Given Vietnam's circumstances, the 
first phase of that action could best be effected by a 
broad-based united front of all anti-colonial factions, in 
which the impetus for action would come more from the 
degree of oppression the revolutionary factions had
4 3sustained than through the precise mode of production.
Ho Chi Minh was well aware that in such circumstances the 
paramount question for communists was that of class 
interests, and here, his insistence on the pre-eminence of 
the party as the guide and protector of the correct 
proletarian line was strictly in accordance with orthodox 
Marxism-Leninism and Comintern directives.
43. D. Marr, Vietnamese Tradition on Trial, 1920-1945, 
Berkeley, 1981, pp 317-318.
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The Comintern's Asian policy began to prosper in 
Vietnam when Ho Chi Minh returned from the USSR in 1925, 
ostensibly to work as a translator for the Comintern 
operative Mikhail Borodin in Canton, but in reality 
charged with the task of establishing an Indo-Chinese 
Communist Party (ICP). The medium he selected was the 
reformist, anti-colonialist organisation Tam Tam Xa, which 
he reconstituted as the Vietnamese Revolutionary Youth 
League, Thanh Nien.
From the outset Thanh Nien reflected Ho Chi
Minh's conviction that action by a united front of all
nationalist factions was the only way of effecting a
Marxist-Leninist revolution in the East. Whereas most
other anti-French organisations were characterised by
44either a narrow membership base or a crude ideology, or 
both, and thus were never likely to secure the necessary 
breadth of support, Thanh Nien's programme was consciously 
directed at all sections of the community. The two main 
elements in its programme were an emphasis, first, on 
patriotism, and, second, on the need for social as well as
44. Foremost among these organisations was the Vietnamese 
Nationalist Front (VNQDD). Its programme rested 
almost entirely on violent action and ignored issues 
such as agrarian reform and working conditions.
After an ill-considered uprising at Yen Bay in 
February 1930 the VNQDD was destroyed by the French.
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political change. The second element was indicative of
the attention paid to protecting class interests. With 
this broadly patriotic and carefully politicised platform, 
Thanh Nien attracted widespread support, ultimately 
emerging as the 'embodiment of the national idea'.
As well as mobilising considerable anti-colonial 
support, Thanh Nien represented a skilful manoeuvre by Ho 
Chi Minh to establish a powerful communist party in 
Vietnam. This aspect of the League was not highly 
publicised by its convenors, although neither was it kept 
secret. Emulating a classical Leninist tactic, Thanh 
Nien was from the beginning guided by an elite vanguard of 
about six committed Marxist-Leninists, a group which Ho 
Chi Minh regarded as 'a future Communist Party'. Through 
its regular news sheet, Thanh Nien gradually introduced 
much of its membership to communist theory. This was 
done with subtlety and caution; for example, it was not 
until the sixtieth issue that Ho Chi Minh explicitly 
connected the future of Vietnam to the Communist Party by 
stating that 'only a Communist Party can ensure the 
happiness of Annam'. By gradually exposing its mass 
membership to Marxism, Thanh Nien's leaders hoped to 
further the League's objective of promoting 'the National 
revolution (the destruction of the French and the
45. 'Thanh Nien ... postulated a new Vietnamese society 
on the basis of a double revolution, both political 
("national independence") and social ("land to the 
tiller").' Huynh Kim Khanh, op. cit., p 64.
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reconquest of the country) and then world revolution (the 
overthrow of imperialism and the realisation of 
communism) . 1 ^
It is noteworthy that Thanh Nien flourished for 
several years despite periodic severe repression from the 
French. When the League did start to disintegrate in the 
late 1920s, it was more as a consequence of internecine 
divisions within the Comintern than of either action by 
the French or the failure of revolutionary theory.
Clause 2 of the 1926 Constitution of Thanh Nien, 
quoted in T. Hodgkin, Vietnam : The Revolutionary 
Path, London, 1981, p 227.
46.
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CHAPTER IV
POWER POLITICS IN THE USSR
Comintern decision making had lived under the 
shadow of Soviet foreign policy since the organisation's 
foundation. In 1928 it was engulfed by that shadow as 
the Soviet hierarchy responded to a series of dramatic 
events. Foremost among these was the culmination of the 
ideological struggle between Stalin and Trotsky over 
socio-economic development in the USSR. This was a 
struggle of epic proportions, in which the central issue 
was that of whether or not the Soviet Union should give 
priority to permanent revolution internationally or to 
building socialism at home.
Powerful domestic and international pressures 
bore down on the protagonists. International pressures 
seemed to be mounting against the USSR from the mid-1920s 
onwards. These originated from two main sources. In 
the first instance the Soviet leadership had to deal with 
the depressing failures of the international socialist 
movement, manifest most graphically in the crushing defeat 
of the German socialists in 1923 and the Chinese disaster 
of 1927. Second, and more immediately threatening, there 
was the re-emergence from the divisions created by World 
War I of a capitalist Europe seemingly united in its 
determination to destroy the world's only socialist state. 
Here, a number of events were particularly significant in 
raising Soviet fears of a war against socialism to a new
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level. One of the most notorious incidents was 
associated with the victory in England in 1924 of the 
Tories over the first Labour Government. On the eve of 
the election the Daily Mail had published a letter 
allegedly written by the President of the Comintern, 
Zinoviev, which contained instructions to British 
communists regarding the organisation of secret 
revolutionary groups in the British armed forces in 
preparation for civil war.'*' While there were doubts 
about the letter's authenticity the Soviets were blamed, 
and to some extent public hostility towards the USSR and, 
by association, socialists generally, was reflected in the 
electoral rejection of the Labour Party. The Soviet role 
in the traumatic general strike called by the British 
Trades Union Congress in support of coal miners in 1925 
was seen as further evidence of a communist intention to 
promote civil disorder in the United Kingdom. Again, 
there was no reliable evidence linking either the
1. The Daily Mail advised its readers: 'A "Very Secret"
letter of instructions from Moscow, which we publish 
below, discloses a great Bolshevik plot to paralyse 
the British Army and Navy and to plunge the country 
into civil war. The letter is addressed by the 
Bolsheviks of Moscow to the Soviet Government 1s 
servants in Great Britain, the Communist Party, who 
in turn are the masters of Mr Ramsay MacDonald's 
Government'. Quoted in Hopkirk, op. cit., p 194.
As Hopkirk notes, whether or not the letter was 
authentic is now academic, but at the time it made a 
powerful impact.
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Comintern or the Soviet Government to the Trade Union 
Congress's action, although the strike did attract vocal 
public support from Zinoviev and Soviet trade unions, 
while a Soviet offer to assist the British strikers 
financially was generally not well-received. The final 
incident in this period of growing international tension 
was the extraordinary 'Arcos affair' in 1927. With the 
approval of the Tory Cabinet - who had been swayed by the 
passionately anti-communist Winston Churchill - British 
police forced their way into the offices of the Soviet 
Trade Delegation and Arcos Ltd, the USSR's official trade 
agency in London, in breach of the diplomatic immunity 
which had been granted under the trade agreement of 1921. 
British officials alleged that the offices were a centre 
of espionage and subversion, but little evidence of this 
was found. Nevertheless, only twelve days after the raid 
the House of Commons voted overwhelmingly in favour of 
severing all relations with Moscow.
The fear these events generated among the Soviet 
hierarchy was exacerbated as the normalisation of 
diplomatic relations gradually reunified Western Europe.
In 1924 the French withdrew from German territory in the 
Ruhr, and in October 1925 the Locarno Treaty was 
formalised. Both of these actions were perceived by the 
USSR as 'turning' the Germans eastwards, away from Europe 
and against the USSR; and, indeed, in this respect, the 
Locarno Treaty, which recognised Germany's western
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boundaries but remained non-commital over the east, was
2less than subtle. Germany's admission to the League of 
Nations in September 1926 appeared - not unreasonably - to 
be one more step along the path to a united capitalist 
attack against the Soviet Union. War fears in the USSR 
were high.
On top of this international pressure, the
Soviet hierarchy was still grappling with the domestic
socio-economic crisis which was a legacy of World War I,
the 1917 revolution, the Civil War and the famine of the
early 1920s : the leadership knew that eventually the
complex theoretical and practical issue of what to do
3about NEP and the peasants had to be faced. In short, 
the USSR was under enormous pressure on all fronts, and it 
was in this intense political atmosphere that the 
ideological struggle between Stalin and Trotsky took 
place.
Two distinctly different responses to meet their 
challenges seemed available to the Soviet leadership.
They could either turn inwards and seek to build the 
strength of socialism in the Soviet Union alone, or they
2. Participants in the Locarno Agreements included 
France, Britain, Italy, Belgium, Poland and 
Czechoslovakia.
3. NEP had reintroduced capitalism to Soviet Russia on a 
widespread, albeit controlled, basis; while, in the 
Marxian analysis, the peasants who had been the 
Bolsheviks' allies in the 1917 revolution were 
inherently petty-bourgeois.
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could look outwards by attempting to export their 
revolution. The latter strategy had, of course, been the 
raison d'etre of the Comintern and, as has been discussed 
in previous Chapters, for various reasons had resulted in 
a series of distressing reverses. Clearly, whichever 
line was now adopted would be of the utmost significance 
for the Soviet-dominated Comintern.
Trotsky was a committed internationalist who
constantly emphasised the importance in backward states of
permanent - i.e. continuing - revolution. In principle
this should have made him an advocate of the Comintern and
its efforts to promote world revolution, particularly in
colonial and semi-colonial states. He did in fact
4strongly support the notion of Comintern, but he 
gradually became one of the most vocal and effective 
critics of the organisation's tactics, to the extent that 
to be guilty of 'Trotskyism' eventually became the most 
heinous crime within the Third International. Trotsky's 
attacks on the Comintern centred on his belief that its 
leaders had failed to adhere to the essential practice, 
clearly identified by Marx and Lenin, of always defending 
the class interests of the progressive revolutionary 
forces. It was, he argued, precisely that failing which
4. See, for example, 'The Program of the International : 
Revolution or a Program of Socialism in One Country?' 
in Trotsky, The Third International after Lenin, pp 
3-73.
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precipitated the Chinese fiasco; on one occasion he 
derided Stalin as 1 the gravedigger of the Chinese 
Revolution' because of the Georgian's support for the CCP- 
Guomindang alliance.
This key theoretical point was made with
characteristic vigour in Trotsky's 'Summary and
Perspectives of the Chinese Revolution', which he prepared
as a critique of the draft programme for the Comintern's
5Sixth Congress in 1928. Trotsky argued that the 
Comintern had been derelict through its careless 
endorsement of nationalist alliances. He accepted the 
basic efficacy of the 'nationalist' strategy, but insisted 
that it had to be circumscribed by precise limits, which 
the Comintern had failed to observe. In a passage 
reminiscent of Lenin's essay on 'The Tasks Facing Russia's 
Social Democrats' /  he stated that:
The sole 'condition' for every agreement 
with the bourgeoisie, for each separate, 
practical, and expedient agreement 
adapted to each given case, consists in 
not allowing either the organizations or 
the banners to become mixed directly or 
indirectly for a single day or a single 
hour; it consists in distinguishing 
between the Red and the Blue, and in not 
believing for an instant in the capacity 
or readiness of the bourgeoisie either 
to lead a genuine struggle against
5. Trotsky, 'Summary and Perspectives of the Chinese
Revolution', in The Third International ..., pp 167- 
230 (June 1928 ) .
6 . See p 16 above.
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imperialism or not to obstruct the 
workers and peasants. 7
As was said long ago, purely practical 
agreements, such as do not bind us in 
the least and do not oblige us to do 
anything politically, can be concluded 
with the devil himself, if that is 
advantageous at a given moment. But it 
would be absurd in such a case to demand 
that the devil should generally become 
converted to Christianity, and that he 
use his horns not against workers and 
peasants but exclusively for pious 
deeds. In presenting such conditions 
we act in reality as the devil's 
advocates, and beg him to let us become 
his godfathers. 8
This analysis was consistent with the theses Trotsky had
presented to the ECCI's Eighth Plenum on the Chinese
Question in which he had placed the blame for the Chinese
fiasco squarely on the inept 'bureaucratic leadership' of
9Stalin and the Comintern. In Trotsky's opinion, the 
continuing promotion of world revolution by the Comintern 
was essential, but, in the process, far more attention had 
to be paid to protecting the class interests of the 
proletariat.
The same 'leftist' approach was manifest in 
Trotsky's proposals for dealing with the USSR's domestic
7. Trotsky, The Third International ..., pp 168-169. 
Emphasis in original.
8. ibid, p 169. Emphasis in original.
9. Degras, Introduction to 'Extracts from the Resolution 
of the Eighth ECCI Plenum on the Chinese Question', 
op. cit., Vol. 2, p 383 (30 May 1927); q.v. pp 382- 
390.
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problems. In concert with his associates of the so- 
called 'ultra-left triumvirate', Kamenev and Zinoviev, 
Trotsky had for some years been calling for the 
introduction in the Soviet Union of rapid
industrialisation and the collectivisation of agriculture. 
Stalin had opposed this proposal, taking a more moderate 
stance by arguing for a continued degree of independence 
for middle and poor peasants, and opposing in principle at 
least the scale of industrialisation advocated by the 
triumvirs.
However, by about mid-1927 Stalin had come to 
the realisation that dramatic changes were needed if the 
Soviets were to meet their international and domestic 
challenges. The course he decided on was precisely that 
of his opponents : rapid industrialisation and the 
collectivisation of agriculture.^ Stalin was turning to 
the left, for industrialisation would lead to a rapid 
growth of the proletariat, while the collectivisation of
10. This change of direction received its most important 
and forceful expression in Stalin's addresses to the 
Fifteenth Congress of the CPSU (B) in December 1927. 
In 'The Success of Socialist Construction and the 
Internal Situation in the USSR', Works, Vol. 10, 
p 299, Stalin spelt out the new line:
'... the party's policy should promote the 
acceleration of the rate of development of industry 
and ensure for industry the leading role in the whole 
of the national economy ... [while] ... the socialist 
forms of economy should be ensured ever-increasing 
relative importance at the expense of the private- 
commodity and capitalist sectors ...'
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agriculture of necessity demanded the expropriation of the 
inherently petty-bourgeois peasantry. However, in 
contrast to Trotsky's vision of international socialist 
development, Stalin's intention was to look inwards. 
Trotsky wanted permanent revolution internationally and 
Stalin wanted its antithesis, socialism in one country.
Once Stalin emerged as the dominant figure in 
Soviet politics at the end of 1927, it was certain that 
this seminal change in his strategy would flow on to the 
Comintern : in particular, alliances with the bourgeoisie 
clearly would become ideologically questionable. Before 
turning to that issue, however, a brief comment on 
Stalin's extraordinary actions vis a vis Comintern policy 
between April 1927 and early 1928 is worthwhile. As was 
mentioned above, Trotsky had been calling for a 
radicalisation of Comintern policy on nationalist 
alliances for some years. Stalin was now faced with the 
embarrassing problem that his new, leftist domestic policy 
was inconsistent with the types of alliances - viz. 
between communist parties and almost any national 
bourgeois movement - which he had to date been ratifying 
for the Comintern.
As long as Trotsky remained on the scene the 
dictates of the power struggle made it impossible for 
Stalin to change the Comintern policy, for this would 
amount to an admission that his rival had been correct all 
the time. Once Trotsky was exiled in December 1927
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Stalin was able to promote his 'new' radical theses 
without embarrassment, and this he did. In the 
intervening period, however, he found himself in the 
awkward position of having to defend existing communist 
party/bourgeois-nationalist alliances.
Thus, only three weeks after the Shanghai 
massacre Stalin argued for a continuation of the alliance 
with the Guomindang by suggesting that Jiang Kaishek's 
party still contained a credible left-wing faction:
The Opposition considers it inexpedient 
for the Communists to participate in the 
Kuomintang ... This means to abandon the 
field of battle and to throw our allies 
in the Kuomintang at the mercy of the 
enemies of the revolution ... [of] 
giving away the banner of the 
Kuomintang, the most popular amongst all 
the banners in China, into the hands of 
the Right-wing Kuomintang elements.
Thus it turns out that by speaking in 
favour of the withdrawal of the 
Communist Party from the Kuomintang at 
the present moment the Opposition is 
playing into the hands of the enemies of 
the Chinese Revolution. 11
In a subsequent address he went to some lengths to give
credit to the anti-imperialist objectives of the
Guomindang, while notably failing to make any comment
12regarding the party's anti-feudalism. So it was that
11. Stalin, 'Questions of the Chinese Revolution', Works, 
Vol. 9, pp 233-234 (21 April 1927). Emphasis in 
original.
12. Stalin, 'Talk with Students of the Sun Yat-Sen 
University', Works, Vol. 9, pp 243-273, esp. pp 248- 
249.
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even after the massacre, China's communist leaders found 
themselves being pressured, solely because of power 
politics within the USSR, to continue in the alliance with 
their Guomindang persecutors.
By the time the Sixth Congress of the Comintern 
convened in Moscow in September 1928 Stalin was in firm 
control in the USSR. The foreign policy implications of 
socialism in one country were now made clear. Stalin had 
abandoned any hope of world revolution in the immediate 
future, and the survival of the USSR had become the main 
imperative for the world communist movement. Delegates 
endorsed a resolution on 'The Soviet Union and its 
Obligations to the International Revolution', the contents 
of which were in fact a direct contradiction of the title, 
for the only obligations recognised were those to the 
USSR:
As the country of proletarian 
dictatorship and socialist construction, 
of tremendous working-class 
achievements, of the alliance of 
proletariat and peasantry, as the 
country of a new civilization advancing 
under the banner of Marxism, the Soviet 
Union was bound to become the base of 
the international movement of all 
oppressed classes, the centre of the 
international revolution, the most 
significant factor in world history ... 
The Soviet Union is the most powerful 
centre of attraction for the colonial 
peoples fighting for their liberation.
The Soviet Union is the true fatherland 
of the proletariat, the strongest pillar 
of its achievements, and the principal 
factor in its emancipation throughout 
the world. This obliges the
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international proletariat to forward the 
success of socialist construction in the 
Soviet Union and to defend the country 
of proletarian dictatorship by every 
means against the attacks of the 
capitalist powers. 13
As far as the East was concerned, delegates gave
the revolutionary movement in the 'colonies and semi-
colonies' a fair degree of attention, eventually adopting
14a lengthy thesis on the subject. The proletarian­
isation of the Soviet Union was reflected in this thesis, 
particularly in relation to revolutionary alliances.
After noting events in the colonies in recent years, the 
thesis arrived at its central conclusion in a section 
entitled 'Need for Communist Independence'. This passage 
identified the dangers which might arise if, in concluding 
nationalist alliances, socialist revolutionaries 
incorrectly estimated the character of the 'big national 
bourgeoisie' and the 'petty-bourgeois parties'. The 
Comintern's assessment was that, as a general rule, 
bourgeois parties would at some stage during an alliance
against imperialism and feudalism shift from the course of
15revolution to that of reform. Not only was this
tendency of the bourgeoisie to retreat into the camp of
13. 'The Proletarian Dictatorship in the Soviet Union and 
the International Socialist Revolution', Degras,
op. cit., Vol. 2, pp 511-513 (September 1928).
14. Sixth World Congress of the Communist International, 
Thesis on the Revolutionary Movement in the Colonies 
and Semi-Colonies, London, 1929.
15. ibid, p 34.
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'national-reformist parties' inconsistent with the 
struggle against the rule of the feudal-imperialist bloc, 
but it also placed them 'in critical contradiction' to the 
class interests of the proletariat.
The Comintern here was identifying the root 
cause of its failure in the East. It then went on to 
present its answer to that failure - the proletarian­
isation of the revolutionary movements in the colonies and 
semi-colonies:
It is absolutely essential that the 
Communist Parties in these countries 
should from the very beginning demarcate 
themselves in the most clear-cut 
fashion, both politically and 
organisationally, from all the petty- 
bourgeois groups and parties. In so 
far as the needs of the revolutionary 
struggle demand it, a temporary co­
operation is permissable, and in certain 
circumstances even a temporary union 
between the Communist Party and the 
national revolutionary movement, 
provided that the latter is a genuine 
revolutionary movement, that it 
genuinely struggles against the ruling 
power and that its representatives do 
not put obstacles in the way of the 
Communists educating and organising in a 
revolutionary sense the peasants and 
wide masses of the exploited. In every 
such co-operation, however, it is 
essential to take the most careful 
precautions in order that this co­
operation does not degenerate into a 
fusion of the Communist movement with 
the bourgeois-revolutionary movement.
The Communist movement in all 
circumstances must unconditionally 
preserve the independence of the 
proletarian movement and its own
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independence in agitation, in 
organisation and in demonstrations. 16
The repetitive use of the adjective 'genuine' in this 
passage is instructive. Having ignored Marx's and 
Lenin's strictures regarding the crucial importance of 
both leadership and the need to protect class interests, 
the Comintern was now, after eight years, abandoning the 
Marxist-Leninist strategy for revolution in the East of 
class cooperation within nationalist alliances. It could 
be argued that, in a belated attempt to rectify years of 
inept leadership, the Comintern was throwing out the baby 
with the bath water.
* * ★ *
The radical change of direction by the Comintern 
was one thing; whether or not that change was of any 
consequence was another. Given the organisation's 
lamentable record, its continuing relevance and 
credibility must have been questioned. The matter of the 
Comintern's relevance must be examined from two different 
perspectives: that of Moscow's, and that of Asia's. As
far as the ruling clique of the Soviet Union was 
concerned, the Comintern was a dead letter after 1928.
That is not to say the organisation was totally ignored; 
on the contrary, instructions and advice were still
16. ibid, p 35. Emphasis in original.
transmitted to colonial revolutionaries under the
imprimatur of Comintern, and agents were still despatched
to provide leadership in accordance with the prevailing 
17doctrine. Further, as will be discussed in more detail
shortly, some leading Asian revolutionaries continued to 
pay the utmost respect to the Comintern's tactical 
guidance. Notwithstanding all that, the fact remained 
that the Third International no longer enjoyed the - 
perhaps visionary - status originally conferred upon it by 
Lenin in 1919 as the highest expression of the struggle of 
the world-wide socialist movement.
With Lenin as its patron the Comintern had 
convened four times in the period between 1919 and his 
death in January 1924. Once Lenin had died, however, 
there was a gap of four years between the Fifth and Sixth 
Congresses, and seven years between the Sixth and Seventh. 
Perhaps the Congresses were delayed in the mid-1920s by 
the internal political machinations then occupying much of 
the Soviet hierarchy's attention, but that would not have 
been the case subsequently. The Seventh Congress in 1935 
was the last formal gathering of the Comintern.
There is little doubt that, from at least as 
early as the struggle to succeed Lenin began, Stalin 
simply was not interested in the Comintern, for by its 
very nature it was likely to provide allies and support
17. See, for example, 0. Braun, A Comintern Agent in 
China, St. Lucia, 1982.
8 8
for Trotsky. Stalin's main concern therefore was to
suppress its activities and turn it against Trotsky.
Unlike Lenin, who spoke at every Comintern Congress during
his lifetime, Stalin never once formally addressed 
18delegates. Trotsky on various occasions noted Stalin's
19contempt for foreign communists, while, according to
Boris Souvarine, the Georgian was once heard to remark
that 'the Communist International represents nothing and
20only exists by our support'. If Stalin did perceive
some value in the organisation after he assumed power, it 
was at best as a tool of Soviet foreign policy.
Asian revolutionaries retained a much more 
respectful attitude towards the Comintern, continuing to 
defer to its directives in appearances at least. 
Appearances were not, however, all that they sometimes 
seemed, as events in China showed. Following the 
Guomindang coup the numbers of Comintern agents in China 
dwindled from scores to a handful and it became extremely 
difficult for the USSR to maintain direct contact with the 
CCP. The Soviets' appreciation of the situation in China 
became even less informed than before. Nevertheless the 
titular leadership of the CCP continued to defer to Moscow
18. Deutscher, op. cit., p 392.
19. Trotsky, The Revolution Betrayed, New York, 1972, 
p 97.
20. Stalin, quoted in B. Souvarine, Stalin, New York, 
1939, p 586.
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and the Comintern : on one notable occasion Li Lisan, head
of the CCP's Politburo, hastened off to Moscow to 'recant'
numerous tactical errors committed by his party - even
though the CCP had in most instances simply been following
Comintern instructions. Chinese leaders apparently found
it difficult to criticise their Soviet forebears, for even
the comparatively independent Mao Zedong never openly
21attacked the Comintern.
Mao Zedong's actions were, however, far more
eloquent than the public face he presented to Moscow. It
was in the period immediately following the Guomindang
counter-revolution that the power base of communism in
China gradually started to shift in concert with the
emergence of Mao's creative revolutionary genius. The
catalyst for this shift was the development under Mao's
guidance of an independent communist force structured in
accordance with his analysis of China's specific
circumstances. Mao's strategy for revolution in China
was based, in the first instance, on the 'colossal' force
of the peasantry, which would 'rise ... like a mighty
storm, like a hurricane, a force so swift and violent that
no power, however great, [would] be able to hold it 
22back'. A protracted war would be fought : rural
21. F. Schurmann and 0. Schell, Republican China, 
Harmondsworth, 1967, p 87.
22. Mao Zedong, 'Report on an Investigation of the 
Peasant Movement in Hunan', Selected Works, (5 
Vols.), Vol. 1, Beijing, 1975, p 23 (March 1927).
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guerilla actions would be superseded by larger
conventional military actions as the communists grew in
strength; eventually, the urban-based Guomindang would be
isolated in their cities and then 'strangled' by the
23rural-based CCP. Victory would be followed by the
establishment, not of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat,
but of the People's Democratic Dictatorship, a four-class
alliance incorporating the 'working class, the peasant
class, the urban petty bourgeoisie, and national 
24bourgeoisie'. The People's Democratic Dictatorship was
a political form particularly suited to both the united 
front concept and realities in China, as Mao subsequently 
explained:
this new-democratic (Chinese) republic 
is also different from the socialist 
republic of the type of the USSR ... the 
republic of the dictatorship of the 
proletariat [which is] ... not yet
23. See Mao Zedong, 'Problems of Strategy in China's 
Revolutionary War', Selected Works, Vol. 1, pp 179- 
254 (December 1936) and 'On Protracted War', Selected 
Works, Vol. 2, pp 113-194 (May 1938).
While those essays were not published until the late 
1930s, the concepts they presented had been developed 
some years before. In relation to the first essay, 
the editor of the Selected Works commented: 'Comrade
Mao Tse-tung wrote this work to sum up the experience 
of the Second Revolutionary Civil War [defined by Mao 
as the period 1927-1937] and used it for his lectures 
at the Red Army College in northern Shensi'.
24. Mao Zedong, 'On the People's Democratic 
Dictatorship', Selected Works, Vol. 4, p 417 (30 June 
1949). This essay confirms the principles laid down 
by Mao in 1940 in 'On New Democracy'.
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suitable for revolutions in colonial and 
semi-colonial countries ... [Following] 
revolutions in colonies or semi-colonies 
the form of state and political power 
will ... be a new-democratic state under 
the joint dictatorship of several anti­
imperialist classes. 25
This analysis and its strategy brought Mao into
conflict with Li Lisan, who had complied with the
directive of the Comintern's Sixth Congress on
'proletarianising1 the revolution by planning a campaign
of urban insurrections. Because of his deviation from
the Comintern line, Mao was expelled from the CCP's
Central Committee, and may even have been expelled from
2 6the party for a period. Disciplinary action did not
chasten Mao. While the CCP's politburo tried to 
reconstruct the remnants of the Red Army into a regular 
(i.e. non-guerilla) unit in order to launch a major 
conventional offensive against the Guomindang, Mao 
continued to build his new revolutionary force in areas 
remote from the cities.
It was of course precisely Mao Zedong's 
independent action, pursued even while he was paying lip 
service to Moscow, which laid the foundations of the 
eventual triumph of the communists in China. The essence
25. Mao Zedong, 'On New Democracy' Selected Works, Vol. 
2, pp 339-384, esp. pp 347-350. (January 1940).
C.P. FitzGerald, op♦ cit., p 67; q.v. E.H. Carr, 
The Twilight of Comintern, 1930-1935, London, 1982, 
p 34 8.
26.
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of Mao's attitude towards the Comintern was captured in an 
interview he gave to Edgar Snow in 1936. Responding to a 
question on the political relationship between 'Soviet 
China' and the USSR and Comintern, he stated:
The Third International is an 
organization in which the vanguard of 
the world proletariat brings together 
its collective experience for the 
benefit of all revolutionary peoples 
throughout the world. It is not an 
administrative organization nor has it 
any political power beyond that of an 
advisory capacity. Structurally it is 
not very different from the Second 
International, though in content it is 
vastly different. But just as no one 
would say that in a country where the 
cabinet is organized by the Social 
Democrats the Second International is 
dictator, so it is ridiculous to say 
that the Third International is dictator 
in countries where there are Communist 
parties.
In the USSR the Communist Party is in 
power, yet even there the Third 
International does not rule nor does it 
have any direct political power over the 
people at all. Similarly, it can be 
said that although the Communist Party 
of China is a member of the Comintern, 
still this in no sense means that Soviet 
China is ruled by Moscow or by the 
Comintern. We are certainly not 
fighting for an emancipated China in 
order to turn the country over to 
Moscow! 27
As Mao Zedong slowly established his hold over 
the entire CCP, so the Comintern began to lose its 
authority. Indeed, by the mid-1930s the Comintern's main
27. Mao Zedong, quoted in Snow, op. cit., pp 443-444.
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claim to relevance in China was the entirely negative one 
that it was partly because of its inept leadership during 
the 1920s that Mao's alternative revolutionary strategy 
had evolved.
A different sequence of events unfolded in 
Vietnam in response to the Sixth Congress's directives on 
tactics. Ho Chi Minh faithfully implemented the 
Comintern's instructions to disband the hitherto 
successful nationalist alliances and, as a consequence, 
led the rising Vietnamese communists into a period of 
unmitigated disaster.
The proletarianisation of parties at all levels 
in colonial countries was intended to prepare the way for 
the establishment of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat 
immediately after political power had been won. This 
created profound problems for Ho Chi Minh, for, given his 
united front policy, the post-revolutionary political form 
of the state in Vietnam was more likely to approximate Mao 
Zedong's concept of a People's Democratic Dictatorship 
than the Dictatorship of the Proletariat. Further, the 
radical direction taken in the Sixth Congress's 
resolutions exposed deep factional differences within 
Thanh Nien, in which an ultra-left group had for some time 
been agitating against the united front concept. 
Ideological differences were brought into sharp relief, 
and the organisation began to disintegrate. By narrowing 
the definition of 'proletarian internationalism' the
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Comintern had exposed the heterogeneous nature of Thanh
Nien's membership, thus precipitating the eventual
2 8collapse of the League in 1929.
In an attempt to resolve the schisms existing in 
Vietnamese communism after the Comintern's Sixth Congress, 
a (subsequently renamed) 'Unification Conference' was held 
in Hong Kong in February 1930, under the chairmanship of 
Ho Chi Minh. During the course of this Conference the 
Vietnamese Communist Party (VCP) was founded, which seemed 
to indicate that most differences had been settled. 
However, the Comintern remained dissatisfied, particularly 
in relation to the need it perceived for greater 
proletarianisation of the Vietnamese revolutionary 
movement. Consequently, the First Plenum of the VCP's 
Central Committee, held eight months later, was instructed 
by the Comintern to redress the 'serious errors' of the 
Unification Conference. The VCP was also instructed to 
change its name to the Indo-Chinese Communist Party (ICP) 
in order to remove any connotations of nationalism.
These changes, which were supported by the ultra-left 
faction of the ICP, effectively nullified nationalism as a 
revolutionary instrument for the Vietnamese Marxist- 
Leninists and, at the same time, undermined Ho Chi Minh's 
authority. Throughout the 1930s Ho held no known 
official position in either the Comintern or the ICP,
28. Huynh Kim Khanh, op. cit., p 113.
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while his political views and role in the early
development of Indo-Chinese communism were severely
29criticised by some erstwhile colleagues.
Shortly after the founding of the ICP the Nghe 
Tinh revolt took place, bringing in its wake a number of 
important consequences for the communists. Nghe Tinh was 
essentially a spontaneous peasant uprising, having as its 
genesis the adverse effects on the Vietnamese countryside 
of the world economic crisis. A degree of politicisation 
was, however, evident, especially in the formation by the 
insurgents of regional governing councils which they 
called 'soviets'.
The revolt exposed the weakness both of the ICP
and the Comintern's proletarianisation strategy. Nghe
Tinh created a quandary for the Comintern hierarchy, who
were dubious of the revolutionary circumstances existing
in Vietnam - particularly in relation to the relative
inactivity of the urban workers - but who also did not
want to miss an apparently promising opportunity.
Comintern officials further appreciated that the feeble
state of the communist party in Indo-China inhibited its
capacity for leadership. Nevertheless, the Comintern
30instructed the ICP to lend active support. Thus, under
the Comintern's somewhat diffident directions, the ICP
29. ibid, pp 181-184.
W.J. Duiker, The Communist Road to Power in Vietnam, 
Boulder, 1981, p 38.
30.
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leadership tried to guide the insurgents in the correct 
revolutionary direction. However, now lacking 
substantial ties to the masses, the party was largely 
ineffectual, particularly in its attempts to get other 
factions - such as the urban bourgeoisie - to support the 
movement. Without the necessary centralised leadership 
(which in many circumstances one might have expected a 
strong communist party to provide), the inchoate uprising 
inevitably collapsed in the face of the savage French 
reaction. So severe were the reprisals exacted by the 
French that it was many years before Vietnamese 
nationalists regained the capacity to mount a mass 
insurrection.
The outcome of this affair serves to illustrate 
the difficulties which can arise for active communist 
revolutionaries when Marx's somewhat mono-factorial theory 
is interpreted rigidly. Here, the Comintern's insistence 
on defining revolutionary forces solely in terms of their 
relationship to the means of production precipitated the 
disintegration of vigorous anti-imperialist forces in
Vietnam.
97
CHAPTER V 
CONCLUSION
Under Stalin's influence the Comintern was
formally dissolved on 8 June 1943,^ ostensibly to promote
united action between the communists and their Western
allies of convenience in the war against fascism. Stalin
received unanimous support from the Presidium of the ECCI:
various communist party central committees claimed that
dissolving Comintern would 'facilitate the union [against
Nazi Germany and its allies] ... of all patriots' and 'cut
the ground from under the feet of the German fascists, who
[had] alleged that Moscow [had] interfered in the affairs
2of other States'. The Comintern, it was agreed, had 
'fulfilled its historic mission ... [and] in its 
organizational form ... had now outlived itself'. There 
may have been some truth in that last assessment. More 
to the point, however, was the fact that Stalin had no 
interest in the organisation and considered that there 
were greater gains to be made, in terms of propaganda in 
the West, by terminating the notorious revolutionary body 
than were likely to accrue from its continued existence.
Notwithstanding Stalin's indifference and the 
general lack of interest in the Comintern during its final
1. 'Statement of the Presidium of the ECCI on the
Dissolution of the Communist International', Degras, 
op. cit., Vol. 3, pp 480-481 (8 June 1943).
2 . ibid, p 480 .
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years, the organisation was not entirely moribund during 
the period between the Sixth Congress in 1928 and its 
dissolution in 1943. Indeed, the Seventh and final 
Congress in 1935 had in some respects been a watershed for 
certain Asian revolutionaries, particularly those of the 
ICP. The reason for this lay in Stalin's rather belated 
recognition of the seriousness of the threat posed to the 
USSR by the rise of fascism : by 1935 the military 
strength and political ambitions of Germany and Japan were 
obvious, and both countries held a profound hatred of
3communists. The Comintern became one of a number of 
mediums through which the Soviets acted to try to 
forestall the fascists. Stalin's response may have been 
belated, but the magnitude of the perceived threat was 
clearly recognised in the scope of the Seventh Congress's 
call to action. It was clear that fascism endangered the 
very existence of the Soviet Union; thus, if the threat 
was to be met all resources had to be marshalled. 
Accordingly, the 'proletarianisation' strategy of 1928 was 
abandoned. There was no equivocation in the Seventh 
Congress's resolution on 'Fascism, Working-Class Unity, 
and the tasks of the Comintern':
3. In November 1936 Germany and Japan concluded an Anti- 
Comintern Pact, directed against their mutual 
political opponent, the USSR. The Pact was 
subsequently joined by Italy in January 1937 and 
Spain in March 1939.
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... fascism [is] the bitterest enemy of 
all the toilers ... it is imperative 
that unity of action be established 
between all sections of the working 
class, irrespective of what organisation 
they belong to ...
Without for a moment giving up their 
independent work in the sphere of 
communist education, organization and 
mobilization of the masses, the 
communists, in order to render the road 
to unity of action easier for the 
workers, must strive to secure joint 
action with the social-democratic 
parties, reformist trade unions and 
other organizations of the toilers 
against the class enemies of the 
proletariat, on the basis of short or 
long-term agreements. At the same 
time, attention must be directed mainly 
to the development of mass action in the 
various localities, conducted by the 
lower organizations through local 
agreements. 4
This 'new' line was of course nothing more than 
a resurrection of the Marxist-Leninist analyses and 
strategies of the early 1920s: it is noticeable that the
prose and sentiments of the Seventh Congress's resolution 
bear a striking similarity to Lenin's tract on 'Left-Wing 
Communism' and his addresses on the National and Colonial
5Question to the early Comintern Congresses. Indeed, the 
Comintern's Secretary-General, Georgi Dimitrov, reminded 
Congress delegates that the Popular Front strategy was a 
Leninist inspiration.
4. 'Extracts from the Resolution of the Seventh
Comintern Congress on Fascism, Working-Class Unity, 
and the Tasks of the Comintern', Degras, op♦ cit♦, 
Vol. 3, p 362 (20 August 1935).
5. See p 31 and pp 34-35 above.
1Ü0
The particular conditions obtaining in the East 
received attention from the Congress, which included in 
its anti-fascist resolution special reference to the 
tactics to be adopted in the colonies:
In the colonial and semi-colonial 
countries, the most important task 
facing the communists consists in 
working to establish an anti-imperialist 
people's front. For this purpose it is 
necessary to draw the widest masses into 
the national liberation movement against 
growing imperialist exploitation, 
against cruel enslavement, for the 
driving out of the imperialists, for the 
independence of the country; to take an 
active part in the mass anti-imperialist 
movements headed by the national 
reformists and strive to bring about 
joint action with the national­
revolutionary and national-reformist 
organizations on the basis of a definite 
anti-imperialist platform ... 6
As Huynh Kim Khanh has noted, the increased
support which communist parties attracted around the world
during 1936-1939 was indicative of the success of the
7united front policy. It was particularly effective in 
parts of Asia. In China, notwithstanding Mao Zedong's 
polite disregard for most directives from the Comintern, 
the change was useful in legitimising a second nationalist 
alliance between the CCP and the Guomindang. By the mid- 
1950s the invasion of China by Japan had reached the stage
6. 'The Anti-Imperialist People's Front in the Colonial 
Countries', Degras, op. cit., Vol. 3, p 367.
7. Huynh Kim Khanh, op. cit., pp 206-207.
lOi
where the ideological differences which split the two 
parties were less important than the need to form a 
nationalist alliance to oppose the invaders. This time, 
however, the coalition was formed in accordance with 
Marx's and Lenin's strictures regarding anti-imperialist 
alliances. Under Mao's guidance the CCP remained aware 
of the necessity to protect class interests. Thus, even 
though the Chinese Soviet Government was officially 
dissolved in 1937 once agreement had been reached 
regarding a joint Nationalist-Communist war of resistance 
against Japan, it in fact continued to function as an 
autonomous regional regime; while this time Jiang g
Kaishek's authority over Red Army units was nominal only. 
There was no question of the CCP allowing itself to 
'merge' with the Guomindang as it had in the mid-1920s, 
and there was never any doubt that civil war would resume 
as soon as the imperialist invasion had been dealt with.
Perhaps more important in the long-term for 
communism in Asia, the Seventh Congress's strategy for 
revolution in the colonies was no longer inconsistent with 
Mao Zedong's analysis of the class relationships existing 
in the East as expressed in his concept of the four-class 
alliance of the People's Democratic Dictatorship. Thus, 
when Mao's blueprint for revolutionary political 
organisations in China, 'On New Democracy', was published
Snow, op. cit., p 24.8 .
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9in 1940, the Chinese Communist leader was in a far more 
comfortable theoretical position than would have been the 
case had the Sixth Congress's proletarianisation strategy 
still prevailed.
The Comintern's change of policy also saw the 
local communists prosper once again in Indo-China. 
Following the Seventh Congress Ho Chi Minh eventually re- 
emerged as the dominant figure in Vietnam. Just as he 
had done prior to 1928, Ho implemented most successfully a 
nationalist alliance as the primary means by which the 
anti-French - i.e. the anti-imperialist - stage of the 
necessary two phase socialist revolution would be 
effected. Ho instructed the resurgent ICP that the first 
goal of national independence could only be achieved 
through a 'broad Democratic National f r o n t T h e  
Democratic Front strategy typified Ho Chi Minh's 
willingness to take a short step now to facilitate a long 
step later, and in its general thrust was a reiteration of 
the basic Marxist-Leninist tactics he had been propounding 
for 15 years.
Ho Chi Minh's programme for a Marxist-Leninist 
'dual' revolution in Vietnam received formal endorsement 
at the ICP's Eighth Plenum, held in Pac Bo in May 1941.
9. Mao Zedong, 'On New Democracy', Selected Works, Vol. 
2, pp 339-384 (January 1940).
10. Ho Chi Minh, 'The Party's Line in the Period of the 
Democratic Front', op. cit., pp 130-131 (July 1939).
10 3
A letter written by Ho immediately after the Plenum 
clearly articulated the nature and purpose of the united 
front which was to complete the first stage of that 
revolution:
Rich people, soldiers, workers, 
peasants, intellectuals, employees, 
traders, youth, and women who warmly 
love your country! At the present time 
national liberation is the most 
important problem. Let us unite 
together ... National salvation is the 
common cause to the whole of our people. 
Every Vietnamese must take part in it.
Significantly the letter did, however, conclude with a 
reminder that there were two stages in the uprising:
Victory to Vietnam's Revolution!
Victory to the World's Revolution! 11
Pac Bo set the scene for the eventual triumph in
August 1945 of the communist-led nationalist forces in
Vietnam. Writing some years later, the authoritative
Vietnamese revolutionary and theoretician Le Duan
described that achievement as 'a victory for Marxism-
Leninism creatively applied to the conditions of a
12colonial and semi-feudal country'.
* * * *
11. Ho Chi Minh, 'Letter From Abroad', op. cit., pp 132- 
134 .
12. Le Duan, The Vietnamese Revolution, New York, 1971, p 14.
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This sub-thesis has suggested that the Marxist- 
Leninist analyses of revolutionary circumstances in the 
East, and the strategies which were developed from those 
analyses, provided the basis for a number of successful 
Asian socialist revolutions. The assessment that socio­
economic conditions in the colonial and semi-colonial 
states were those either of Oriental despotism or, at 
best, semi-feudalism, led Marx and Lenin to two seminal 
conclusions. First, they determined that any socialist 
revolution in Asia would have to consist of two phases : 
initially, there would be a nationalist revolution as a 
means of overthrowing imperialism and feudalism; and then 
there would be a socialist revolution. Because of those 
distinct requirements, during the first phase of the 
revolution at least, nationalist alliances and class 
cooperation would be acceptable strategies; indeed, 
because of the existing class forces, it was unlikely that 
the first phase could be effected without some sort of 
alliance. This latter conclusion was not only reflective 
of circumstances in Asia, but also was a prime example of 
the activist element existing in Marxism, and which later 
was so clearly understood by Lenin, Mao Zedong and Ho Chi 
Minh.
For the strategy to succeed, communist 
leadership had to be informed, positive, flexible and, 
most important, responsive at all times to class 
interests. It was primarily in this crucial area of
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leadership that the Third International failed. The 
formal adoption of the Marxist-Leninist strategy by the 
early Comintern Congresses was one thing; putting it into 
practice proved to be another. Once it became apparent 
that the Bolshevik triumph of 1917 was not going to ignite 
the hoped-for European socialist revolution and that 
Soviet Russia was going to have to stand alone, then, 
despite Lenin's best intentions, the Comintern 
increasingly became little more than a tool of Soviet 
foreign policy, in which the paramount consideration for 
all communists became the survival of the socialist 
'fatherland'. Moscow's revolutionary prestige was such 
that, despite the dreadful defeats which communist parties 
in the Near East suffered in the early 1920s as a 
consequence of Comintern decisions and actions, their 
counterparts in the Far East continued obediently to 
follow instructions.
By the time the focus shifted to the Far East, 
political decisions in the Soviet Union - and, therefore, 
in the Comintern - were being made against the backdrop of 
the intense ideological struggle between Stalin and 
Trotsky. The machinations of that struggle played no 
small part in the ill-advised Comintern instructions, 
issued in the face of clear danger signs, to the CCP to 
continue in its nationalist alliance with the Guomindang. 
Following the massacre of the Chinese communists the 
gradual rise of Mao Zedong saw the CCP move to a far more
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independent position: in future, while deference was
always ostensibly paid to the Comintern, Mao quietly 
followed his own revolutionary course, in which the class 
alliance of the People's Democratic Dictatorship was a key 
factor.
While Ho Chi Minh's revolutionary perspectives 
for the East were similar to Mao's, the Vietnamese leader 
faithfully effected Comintern directives and, as a 
consequence, his movement suffered a major setback 
following the instructions from the Sixth Congress in 1928 
for all revolutionaries to proletarianise their 
organisations. This directive, as it happens, arose 
largely as a result of Stalin's victory over Trotsky and 
the implementation in the USSR of 'socialism in one 
country' : little, if any, consideration was given to the 
circumstances of Eastern revolutionaries. The 
resurrection by the Seventh Comintern Congress in 1935 of 
nationalist alliances and class cooperation as acceptable 
revolutionary tactics proved most successful for Asian 
communists, even though the Comintern's decision was made, 
not in response to conditions in the East, but rather to 
counter the emerging threat, particularly to the USSR, of 
fascism.
The Seventh Congress's resolution on class 
alliances was the last decision of any real moment taken 
by the Third International. Stalin had no interest in 
the organisation and eventually dissolved it in 1943 in
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order to score a few propaganda points in the West. For 
most of its life the Comintern had endorsed theories and 
tactics for revolution in the East which, if applied as 
intended by Marx and Lenin and with a clear understanding 
of local circumstances, seemed sound in theory and 
realistic in practice; while for a shorter period the 
organisation had promoted strategies which were 
unquestionably inimical to the prospects of those who 
followed them. Regrettably for Asian communists, 
whichever strategies the Comintern adopted were almost 
invariably impaired by the organisation's inept or 
disinterested leadership.
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